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4Abstract
THIS PAPER DESCRIBES THE OPERATION OF EXISTING STATE 
TAXES; EVALUATES THE DIFFERENT TAXES IN TERMS OF THEIR 
EFFECTS ON REVENUE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND SIMPLICITY; 
AND PROPOSES A NUMBER OF REFORM PACKAGES TO 
INCREASE NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY AND IMPROVE SIMPLICITY. 
The proposals are approximately revenue 
neutral in aggregate and minimize 
redistribution relative to the current economic 
incidence. The proposed reforms include: 
remove current exemptions to achieve 
comprehensive payroll and land tax bases, 
and apply flat rates with individual state rights 
to choose the rate and to vary it over time; 
remove the transaction taxes on conveyance 
and stamp duties on insurance; replace the 
current suite of Commonwealth and state 
taxes on the use of motor vehicles with a 
user charge and special indirect taxes to 
internalize the external costs of pollution 
and congestion; and, focus special taxes on 
gambling to collect a share of the economic 
rent generated by government restrictions on 
supply.
Key words: taxation reform; state taxes; 
payroll tax; stamp duty; royalties; land tax; 
federalism; vertical fiscal imbalance; road 
charges; gambling tax
5The Commonwealth Government is engaged 
in a review of the federation, for which a 
Green (options) Paper is expected to be 
delivered towards the end of 2015 after 
consultation with the States and potentially a 
White Paper after that.1 The Commonwealth 
is also engaged in a White Paper on taxation 
reform.2 
This paper addresses reform of State taxes 
with the goal of making a useful contribution 
to both reviews.3 In its Tax Discussion Paper, 
Re:think (Treasury 2015), the government 
discusses aspects of State, territory and 
local taxes but focuses most attention on 
Commonwealth taxes. This paper evaluates 
the current suite of State taxes in terms of 
their revenue collection; efficiency including 
distortions to decisions or deadweight 
costs; equity or fairness; and simplicity 
and resilience of the tax. The paper then 
provides a set of reform options. We suggest 
that reforming State taxes is important 
for enhancing future economic prosperity 
for Australia as a whole, as well as for the 
prosperity of individual States. That is, State 
tax reform is not just one component of 
reforming the federation or the Australian 
tax system – it is a key component. The 
proposed reforms offer considerable gains in 
efficiency and transparency, and some gains 
in simplicity. At the same time, we suggest 
that State reform packages can be designed 
to generate approximately the same revenue 
and with minimum redistribution effects in 
the longer run. 
In the federation review process, five issues 
papers have been released, focusing on 
areas including housing, health, education 
and federal financial relations, and a draft 
discussion paper has also been released. 
According to its terms of reference, the 
federation review process is committed 
to refining and redefining the roles and 
1  See www.dpmc.federation.gov.au .
2  See http://bettertax.gov.au .
3  We refer to “States” hereinafter to include 
both States and territories unless specifically stated 
otherwise.
responsibilities of the States so that 
Australia’s federation – now 114 years old – 
can operate in a more efficient and effective 
manner when faced with the challenges of 
an increasingly global economy and mobile 
population. Issues Paper 5 released by the 
Federation Task Force addresses federal 
financial relations.  
The Commonwealth currently accesses 
revenue in excess of its needs and the States 
have responsibilities for service delivery 
that are in excess of their own-source 
revenues. This ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’ (VFI) 
is “relatively high” compared with other 
federations which suggests that “a high 
degree of VFI creates perverse incentives for 
both levels of government” (DPMC 2015, p. 
3). This may be hindering the effectiveness 
and efficiency of Australia’s federation, with 
associated costs of fiscal irresponsibility, 
blame-shifting and lack of accountability to 
voters at both State and Commonwealth 
levels. 
Much debate about reforming fiscal 
federalism concerns potential reform of the 
Commonwealth income tax and the Goods 
and Services Tax (GST), and the potential for 
reallocation or sharing of these tax bases 
between the States and the Commonwealth. 
We do not address those issues here, 
although they will be an important element 
in any overall reform package. Re:Think 
discusses State taxes but neither the 
Federation papers nor Re:Think address State 
tax reform in detail. However, the Re:Think 
paper asks in the Consultation Questions:
Question 52: What are the relative 
priorities for state and local tax reform and 
why? In considering reform opportunities 
for particular state taxes, what are the 
broader considerations that need to be 
taken into account to balance equity, 
efficiency and transitional costs?
There is a risk that in the federation and tax 
reform debates currently underway, the 
problems and challenges for reform of State 
taxes may be lost. Consequently, this paper 
sets out the basic economic case for analysis 
and reform of State taxes, which we argue 
1. Introduction
6is critical to Australia’s future prosperity and 
government revenues. This paper considers 
some reform options to improve efficiency 
and simplicity which are approximately 
revenue neutral. A more technical economic 
analysis of the different taxes and reform 
options is in the Appendices.
The paper is organised as follows. Part 2 
summarises previous reviews and reform 
proposals. Part 3 outlines the criteria for 
assessing State taxes. Part 4 broadly surveys 
current State taxes. Parts 5 to 9 evaluate 
taxes on payrolls, land, stamp duties, motor 
vehicles, gambling and minerals and propose 
a set of reform options on these taxes. This 
set of reform options can be compared to 
those recommended by the Henry Review, 
which have also been provided in Parts 5 
to 9. In conclusion, Part 10 returns to the 
challenges for State tax reform and the need 
for a federal solution. 
7The most recent comprehensive review of 
Australian taxation is the Review of Australia’s 
Future Tax System (Henry et al, 2009) (“Henry 
Review”). The Henry Review examined all tax 
bases in detail and recommended significant 
tax reforms at Commonwealth, State and 
local levels (see further Stewart et al 2015). 
The Review argued for state taxing powers 
to be negotiated on a cooperative basis in 
order to facilitate tax reform that will benefit 
Australia as a whole. 
There have also been numerous State tax 
reviews that have been conducted in the last 
few years. These include the Victorian Review 
of State Business Taxes (Victorian Tresury, 
2001), the WA State Tax Review (WA Treasury, 
2007) and the IPART Review of State Taxation 
(IPART, 2008). Most of these reviews have 
not led to major reform. However, recently, 
the ACT Taxation Review (ACT Government, 
2012) has led to a significant and positive tax 
reform package in the ACT.4 This year, the 
South Australian government has released 
the South Australia Discussion Paper (SA 
Treasury, 2015) although it is not clear 
whether that government is willing to carry 
out a major reform. Numerous academic and 
other studies have reviewed state taxation 
and proposed reforms. Examples include 
Gabbitas and Eldridge (1998), Crowe (1996), 
Freebairn (2002), and Warren (2010).  
4  See http://apps.treasury.act.gov.au/taxreform .
In brief summary, proposals for reform for 
State taxes from the Henry Review and the 
State Reviews include:
 ■ Payroll tax be broadened (including 
removing thresholds) to capture value 
added by labour in all (or most) businesses.
 ■ Stamp duties on property conveyance 
duties be abolished and replaced with a 
reformed comprehensive land tax and/or 
an enlarged consumption tax (the latter is 
likely to require an increase in the GST rate 
or base). 
 ■ Other stamp duties, including on insurance 
premiums, be replaced with a larger GST
 ■ State motor taxes, along with 
Commonwealth excise on petroleum, 
be replaced with road user charges or 
transport taxes and explicit congestion and 
pollution charges
 ■ Gambling taxes be reviewed in light of 
fiscal and social policy considerations. 
 ■ State royalties be replaced with an 
economic rent tax. 
Some of these proposed measures, such as 
the payroll tax proposal, include uniformity of 
the tax base across the states, but with the 
option for each state to choose a different tax 
rate. 
2. Previous reviews
8Overall, tax reform should aim to support 
adequate revenue collection, economic 
prosperity, fairness and a stable, resilient tax 
system. In this part, we follow convention 
in assessing current state taxes and reform 
options in terms of revenue collected, 
efficiency, equity and simplicity. 
REVENUE
A key role for taxation is to transfer revenue 
from private use to what are considered 
relatively more valuable uses by government. 
In effect, taxation revenue is a proxy for the 
transfer of limited society labour, capital 
and natural resources from the production 
of private sector goods and services, such 
as food and entertainment, to government 
provided goods and services, such as law and 
order and education, and for redistribution 
to meet society equity goals. Clearly, there 
is an on-going debate, and a contentious 
debate with many alternative legitimate 
positions, about the relative magnitudes of 
market failure versus government failure, 
about the valuation of non-market goods and 
service, and about vertical and distributional 
equity which have a bearing on the share of 
government in the economy, and then the 
taxation revenue sought.
In the context of the Australian federation, 
there is another set of arguments about the 
allocation of government expenditure tasks 
between the different levels of government. 
Similarly, there is a set of arguments about 
the more appropriate taxes to be collected by 
the different levels of government. In general 
the less the geographical mobility of activities 
associated with a particular tax base, with 
land the prime example, the more appropriate 
the tax for state use to collect revenue. 
Inevitably, there is an outcome of vertical 
fiscal imbalance (VFI). In Australia, as an 
aggregate, the States depend on transfers 
from the Commonwealth for about half of 
their revenue, and state administered taxes 
represent about a third of state expenditure. 
The relative reliance on various taxes by 
State and local governments, relative to 
expenditures, Commonwealth grants and the 
GST is illustrated in Figure 1 below, drawn 
from the draft Discussion Paper released by 
the Federalism task force (2015; a similar 
chart is in Re:Think). 
Figure 1: VFI – State spending, taxes and Commonwealth 
transfers 2013-14.
Source: State budget papers; ABS. cat. no. 5512.0 and 
Commonwealth Final Budget Outcome 2013-14. 2013-14 
data. 
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9In a context where we have a high degree of 
VFI, greater state government accountability 
requires a “hard budget constraint” (Bird and 
Smart, 2010). By this it is meant that if a state 
government proposes to increase or decrease 
an expenditure of $x million, it funds that 
change with an addition to, or reduction of, its 
own taxation of $x million. State responsibility 
for funding marginal expenditure changes 
requires that states have access to taxes for 
which they can change the rates and/or base; 
other conditions for a hard budget constraint 
include transparent Commonwealth transfers, 
and state government limitations on budget 
deficits. In this paper, we do not address 
other potential reforms that could include 
revenue sharing of the income tax with the 
States.
EFFICIENCY
Taxes generally involve costs to society 
larger than the dollar for dollar transfer. Most 
taxes change relative prices, which in turn 
lead households and businesses to change 
their decisions in a way which results in less 
household utility and business profits. Taxes 
change decisions in labour markets, in the 
aggregate levels and composition of saving 
and investment, the organization of business, 
and so forth. These changed decisions result 
in a misallocation of economic resources 
when compared with the pre-tax decisions.
The measure of efficiency used in this paper 
is the marginal excess burden (Gabbitas and 
Eldridge, 1998; see also Re:think, 2015 and 
Treasury, 2015). This measures the efficiency 
cost of raising an additional dollar of revenue. 
Amongst other factors, the efficiency of State 
taxes is affected by:
1. The tax base, and special exemptions and 
deductions from each tax base;
2. The tax rate;
3. The price responsiveness of demand and 
supply; and
4. The presence of Commonwealth taxation.
FAIRNESS
All taxes have distributional consequences, 
both for vertical and horizontal equity. It has 
been argued that taxes with redistributive 
objectives should be levied by the 
Commonwealth, rather than by the State or 
local tiers. However, it is necessary for the 
States to pay attention to the equity effects 
of the taxes they choose to employ. A key 
principle of tax fairness for States is a benefit 
theory that ensures contributions on the 
basis of capacity in exchange for government 
services provided by the State government. 
It is necessary to adjust for low income 
households, but this may be done both at 
State level and, in an overall reform package, 
may involve addressing regressive effects of 
some taxes with improved progressivity in 
others, including federal taxes, or in transfers 
from one level of government. 
An independent study conducted by Gabbitas 
and Eldridge (1998) found that although many 
State taxes appear to be fair since the rate 
of taxation increases with the size of taxable 
transaction, many rate poorly on the fairness 
scale in terms of actual effect. State taxes tend 
to be regressive or at best neutral both from the 
perspective of horizontal and vertical equity. 
The inequities in the State tax system are 
attributable in part to the following factors:
1. States are only able to levy a limited 
range of taxes. This contributes to the overall 
regressive nature of the State tax system.
2. Tax bases are less than comprehensive 
so that similar activities are taxed differently. 
In practice, many State taxes have narrowed 
their tax bases through a wide range of 
exemptions or concessional arrangements. 
This is a major source of horizontal inequity 
and has arisen in part from competitive 
bidding by the states.  
3. Incomplete coverage and implementation, 
which can cause vertical inequities within the 
tax system.
4. Most State taxes do not have progressive 
rates, or even when they do, those rates have 
only minor progressive effects.
10
Assessment of the distributional effects 
of taxes should consider the time frame 
and distinguish between statutory tax 
incidence, or who writes the tax cheque to 
government, and economic incidence, or who 
bears the cost of the tax after households 
and businesses change their decisions in 
response to the taxes and a new equilibrium 
is reached. Ultimately, all taxes are born 
by households as a combination of lower 
take-home wages, lower returns on capital 
income earned on savings, higher prices of 
goods and services, or a combination. Tax 
changes alter relative prices, for example 
income tax falls on hours worked but not on 
non-market work or leisure, and it affects 
market produced goods and services but less 
so home produced alternatives. The final or 
economic incidence of a tax is determined by 
the changed equilibrium prices and quantities. 
Often the adjustment period to the new 
equilibrium can be many years. 
SIMPLICITY AND RESILIENCE
The complexity or simplicity of a tax 
determines its associated administration 
and compliance costs. It is also important to 
analyse the extent to which a State tax base 
is resilient to dramatic changes taking place in 
work, business and commercial practices in 
Australia, and to tax planning.
The complexity of state taxes and its 
associated compliance costs continue to 
impact upon businesses operating nationally. 
Despite some harmonization of tax bases 
that have been carried out under the 1999 
Intergovernmental Agreements, State 
governments continue to levy a large number 
of different taxes with different structures, 
bases and rates (see, eg Business Council of 
Australia, 2008). 
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In 2012-13 State and Territory governments 
collected $63.5 billion in State taxes, equal 
to 4% of GDP, plus another $10.6 billion in 
royalties on the mining industry (ABS, 2014). 
Although states have a broad constitutional 
power to tax, they currently impose a limited 
range of taxes that are often said to be less 
than optimal (Stewart, 2011). Most state 
taxes have been criticised for exhibiting 
one or more of the classic characteristics 
of ‘bad taxation’: they have been said to be 
complex, inefficient (for levying on narrower 
than necessary bases) and responsible for 
distorting behaviour, thereby generating high 
deadweight losses (Carling, 2006). Despite 
these criticisms, states have largely retained 
their narrow, inefficient and regressive 
taxes. They have for example, resisted 
recommendations to abolish duties on 
property transfers and insurance and been 
reluctant to extend the base of land taxes 
to cover homes and reform its rate structure 
(Carling, 2006).
Since federation in 1901, changes in the 
State taxation system have been inextricably 
linked to and shaped by changes in 
intergovernmental financial relations including 
a shift in taxing power from the states to the 
Commonwealth. This shift has largely been 
driven by a series of High Court decisions, 
State and Commonwealth political decisions 
and broader social and political pressures, 
especially pressures for increased taxation 
in wartime and to fund the welfare state 
(Stewart, 2011; Smith, 1993). The High Court’s 
increasingly expansive interpretation of 
federal taxing powers over time has led to the 
point where now, 114 years after federation, 
major tax fields are fully occupied by the 
Commonwealth government which levies the 
income tax, goods and services tax (GST), 
fringe benefits tax and duties of customs and 
excise. In contrast, the States levy a limited 
range of taxes. Although there are many state 
taxes, inter-state competition has meant that 
the base for the important revenue raising 
taxes is essentially narrow with a growing 
list of special exemptions and deductions 
(Stewart, 2011). 
Council rates raised $13.2 billion 
in 2012-13 (ABS 2014). The 
revenues from conveyance duty 
and royalties have exhibited 
considerable volatility over the 
last decade, while revenues 
from payroll tax, land tax and 
Council rates are fairly stable 
(PBO 2015, Figure 2-5).
A summary of the tax bases, 
or taxable sums, and tax rate 
schedules for the main taxes are 
provided in Table 2 overleaf.
The next five Parts of this paper 
address each of the main tax 
bases for States: payroll tax; 
land tax; stamp duty; vehicle 
taxes, gambling taxes and 
royalties.
4. Current State Taxes
TABLE 1: STATE GOVERNMENT TAXATION, 2012-13
TAX CATEGORY $BILLION PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
STATE TAXES (%)
Payroll tax 20.8 32.8
Land tax 6.2 9.8
Stamp Duty
   Conveyances
   Insurance







Other motor vehicle 6.1 9.6
Gambling 5.5 8.7
Total 63.5 100
Mineral Royalties 10.6 16.7
Source: ABS, Taxation Revenue, 2012-13, Cat 5506.0 (May 2014), and 
State budget papers. 
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TABLE 2: BASE AND RATE SCHEDULES FOR SELECTED STATE TAXES, 2012-13
TAX CATEGORY TAX BASE TAX RATES 
Payroll Wages and salaries, employer super, eligible 
termination payments, grossed up value of 
fringe benefits. Some special exemptions 
for charitable and religious institutions, 
government departments and public hospitals 
and schools. Some rebates available for 
employers with an annual payroll below a 
particular threshold. 
A small business exemption ranging from $550,000 
per year in Vic to $1,750,000 per year in ACT. Then a 
flat rate varying from 4.75% in Qld to 6.85% in ACT.  
Land* Unimproved land value.  Main exemptions 
include principal place of residence, primary 
producers, charitable religious and educational 
bodies.   
Progressive rate schedule, with different thresholds 
and rates across the states. 
For a few States, different tax rates apply for 
companies and trustees. 
For a few States, a Metropolitan Region  
Improvement Tax is also levied on the unimproved 
value of land situated in a metropolitan region.  
Conveyance Duty Turnover tax. Duty is payable on the 
conveyance of residential and commercial 
immovable (real) property, by sale or gift, and 
on the transfer of interests in land-rich trusts. 
Duty is usually payable by the purchaser, 
calculated on the sale price of the property (or 
market value if higher). 
Exemptions and concessions exist for first 
home buyers. 
Progressive rate schedule, including a tax free 
threshold, which varies across the States. Top rate 
varies from 4.50% from sale of $3,000,000 and above 
in NT to 5.75% from sale of $1,000,000 and above in 
Qld. 
Stamp Duty on 
Insurance
Premiums paid. Exemptions, including 
workers’ compensation and others with 
variance across States. 
Flat rate. Varies from 6% in ACT to 11% in SA. 
Concessional rates available in NSW. 
Taxes on Motor Vehicles
(a) Registration Fee Turnover tax. Flat fee varies across the States based on the type 
of motor vehicle (car, cycle, lorry) and/or type of fee 
(traffic improvement fee, plate fee) 
(b) Motor vehicle 
tax
Charged annually; varies by State: may be 
based on weight, engine capacity or number 
of cylinders. 
Varies for private vehicles, business vehicles, heavy 
vehicles and motor cycles. 
(c)Driver’s license 
fee
Concessions available for pensioners Flat fee that varies by State, according to duration of 
license. 
(d) Transfer fee. Flat fee that varies by State based on type of motor 
vehicle (car, cycle, lorry). 
Taxes on Gambling Usually gross turnover, but some per unit 
activity. 
A wide range of rates on different forms of gambling 
including racing, gaming machine, casinos and 
lotteries. 
Mineral Royalties In terms of share of revenue collected, for 
most minerals, and in particular the export 
products, an ad valorem levy is imposed on 
the value of sales, except for the NT which 
uses a profit base measure, Most lower value 
minerals used in the construction industry face 
a specific levy per tonne.  
A wide range of ad valorem rates ranging from 
zero for Vic gold up to 12.5% for QLD coal when 
prices very high. Rates vary by mineral, by level of 
processing, by state, and in some cases by mining 
method. Some key ad valorem rates for the large 
revenue earners are 5-7.5% for WA iron ore, 7-12.5% 
for QLD coal, 6.2-8% for NSW coal, 3.5 5% for SA, 
and other metals 2-3%. NT profit tax rate of 20%
*Not imposed in NT. Source: NSW Treasury, Interstate Comparison of Taxes 2013-14, for royalties, Government of Western Australia (2015), 
Mineral Royalty Rate Analysis: Final Report, 2015, drawing on state budget papers.
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The payroll tax was introduced by the federal 
government in 1941 to fund the national 
child endowment, a widespread welfare 
payment. It was intended to operate to a 
significant degree as a ‘benefit tax’ intended 
to be borne by wage-earners to fund social 
services, although the revenues were 
never hypothecated to this purpose. This 
was similar to the social security taxes that 
continue to be levied on wage-earners (by 
deduction from the employer) in many other 
countries including the US, Canada and much 
of Europe. 
In 1971, the federal government handed over 
its ‘least favourite’ tax base to the states 
(Smith, 1993). Since then, the payroll tax 
has been one of the highest revenue-raising 
taxes for the states, becoming the most 
important state tax in terms of revenue 
collection. It raises more revenue in the most 
populous and industrialised states of NSW 
and Victoria than in smaller, agricultural or 
resource-rich states (Smith, 1993). In the shift 
to States, the link to welfare benefits was 
lost, as expenditures on child endowment and 
other welfare payments remained with the 
Commonwealth.
CURRENT PAYROLL TAX
Payroll tax is levied on employers. Payroll tax 
collected $20.75 billion in 2012-13, just under 
a third of all state taxation revenue.
The basic law applicable to the payroll tax 
base has been successfully harmonized 
across the states and the payroll tax can be 
viewed as the tax base which has been the 
most successfully harmonized between the 
States. In most states, except Queensland, 
a single flat rate is applied, but with different 
rates. However, tax competition has 
increasingly crept into the payroll tax base. 
Most popular calls for reform of the payroll 
tax seek its abolition or reduction of the rate, 
as it is perceived to fall on business. Indeed, 
the economic incidence of payroll tax has 
been a topic of contention. 
In general, a comprehensive labour 
remuneration base is used, including wages 
and salaries, employer superannuation 
contributions, eligible termination payments, 
and some fringe benefit payments. Special 
exemptions are made for charitable and 
educational institutions, and sometimes as 
a component of particular state government 
strategies to help attract “footloose” firms to 
locate in a State for “special” projects. 
The biggest detraction from a comprehensive 
payroll tax base is the small firm exemption. 
The definition of an exempt business varies 
widely from State to State. The minimum 
threshold effectively means that most small 
businesses are exempt from payroll tax. 
Current state payroll taxes exempt about 
a half of a comprehensive base of labour 
remuneration. All states exempt small 
businesses, with the exemption ranging from 
an annual payroll of $550,000 for Victoria to 
$1.75 million for the ACT. The threshold is not 
automatically indexed for inflation or wages in 
any state but it is common for the states to 
adjust the threshold upwards by an arbitrary 
amount every few years. 
For those firms subject to payroll tax, beyond 
a tax free threshold a flat rate applies but 
at different rates across the states, ranging 
from 4.75% in Queensland to 6.85% in the 
ACT. A single flat rate of payroll tax on the 
taxable sum is applied in all states except 
Queensland and the Northern Territory. It is 
now levied on largely the same tax base at 
a single rate in all States except Queensland 
and the Northern Territory. Queensland 
and the Northern Territory set their payroll 
tax rate to recapture revenue lost by the 
threshold exemption. As with the base, the 
rate of payroll tax is adjusted over time, and 
generally downward over history.
The ability and observed willingness of 
state governments to change the payroll 
tax base and tax rate over time indicates 
that payroll tax is a discretionary source 
of state tax revenue, and therefore an 
important component of a state hard budget 
constraint. This also suggests that, while it is 
an important base, steps may be needed to 
prevent harmful tax competition. 
5. The payroll tax
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A comprehensive payroll tax would be a 
relatively efficient tax for the states, and 
certainly remove some of the distortion costs 
of the present system. In the long run, a 
reform package with a comprehensive base 
and a lower flat rate which approximately is 
aggregate revenue would have fairly minor 
redistributive effects on employees.
The exemptions in current payroll taxes 
distort the choices of business structure, 
organisation and employment, thereby 
distorting the productive allocation of labour 
in the economy. Thresholds exert a downward 
bias on firm sizes and significant dead-weight 
losses may arise from these threshold-
induced reductions in firm size (Dixon et al., 
2004; Freebairn, 2009). 
Many, and in particular business 
organisations, often assert that payroll tax is 
an impost on business rather than a payment 
by workers. However, as argued in Appendix 
1, a comprehensive payroll tax as a tax on 
labour demand has a similar incidence as 
PAYG tax levied on labour supply. With labour 
demand much more elastic than labour 
supply, the economic incidence of both 
primarily falls on employees as lower take-
home pay than otherwise. 
The long term incidence and distributional 
effects of the selective payroll tax are very 
different to the statutory incidence. Large 
businesses pay the tax to government. 
The adjustment of the wage cost and of 
employment mean that most of the tax 
in a long run equilibrium is passed back 
to employees of both large and small 
businesses as a lower market wage than 
otherwise (or lower rate of wage increase 
over time). That is, all employees, including 
those employed by small business, bear most 
of the payroll tax levied on large business.
REFORM PROPOSALS
There are three elements to the design or 
structure of payroll tax reform proposed by 
this paper:
1. Comprehensive base with minimal 
exemptions. Harmonise the base across all 
states.
2. Flat rate. But, each state has the right to 
set a different rate and to vary the rate over 
time for a “hard budget” constraint.






State payroll taxes should eventually 
be replaced with revenue from more 
efficient broad-based taxes that capture 
the value-add of labour.
These reforms would:
1. Remove distortions to the choice of 
business organisation, and generate 
efficiency gains 
2. Like a labour income tax and the GST, 
payroll tax distorts labour market decisions. 
But, like the GST a payroll tax involves 
minimal capital market distortions affecting 
decisions on the aggregate levels and 
composition of saving and investment.
3. Simplify tax administration and compliance
4. If a revenue neutral broader base and 
lower rate package, the reform package 
will  have similar effects on the take-home 
wages for employees of both large and small 
businesses.
In terms of effects of reform of payroll tax on 
aggregate revenue there are two options:
1. Generate the same revenue but create 
less labour market distortions by a package 
with a comprehensive base and lower rate.
2. Increase revenue from a relatively efficient 
tax in order to replace other taxes. 
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There remains the issue of tax competition in 
the federation. It may be possible to consider 
returning to a nationally defined base and 
rate, or harmonisation of the base (including 
exemptions) and mandating a single base 
rate. It is also possible to consider collection 
of payroll tax on the Pay-As-You-Go wage tax 
base which applies to most workers.
On the other hand, a further argument for a 
larger state payroll tax with coverage of all 
workers is its potential contribution to a hard 
budget constraint for better state budget 
decisions. As a relatively efficient tax with 
a low marginal cost, the payroll tax rate can 
be changed at the margin by each state to 
fund changes in state expenditure. This has 
potential to return it to be a tax on wages to 
fund the benefit of government services in a 
broad sense in that state. A State population 
that sought better services may be willing 
to have a higher payroll tax. A larger payroll 
tax would be a state tax option to reduce 
vertical fiscal imbalance, and probably as a 
component of a wider tax reform package 
including adjustments to other taxes and to 
Commonwealth-state financial arrangements.
A larger revenue payroll tax package would 
mean a lower effective wage to employees 
and a small fall in employment by both large 
and small businesses and in aggregate. 
To the extent that minimum wages are 
a binding constraint for some low wage 
employees, some of the adjustment will be 
an increase in unemployment. It is likely that 
the unemployment response will be more 
important for small business employees. A 
complete general equilibrium assessment of 
the redistribution effects of a larger revenue 
payroll tax reform would require details of the 
use of the additional payroll tax revenue as 
reductions in other taxes and/or increases in 
government expenditure as an offset to the 
lower take-home wage.
One payroll tax reform option is to combine a 
comprehensive payroll tax base and a lower 
rate in an approximate revenue neutral reform 
package. Payroll tax rates on a comprehensive 
base with a rate between 2.5 and 3.5 
per cent, depending on the state, would 
generate about the same revenue. Simplicity, 
and associated low tax administration 
and compliance costs, including for small 
business, could be gained by using as the 
comprehensive payroll tax base either the 
existing state workers’ compensation base 
or the existing Commonwealth PAYG labour 
income tax base. Such a package would have 
minimal redistributive effects on employees, 
and by removing distortions to the choice of 
business type it would result in a net gain for 
society.
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Taxes on land were advocated as early as 
the 1840s and introduced in most Australian 
colonies before federation in 1901. Early land 
taxes were tools of social justice and wealth 
redistribution designed to ‘unlock the land’ 
for the ‘poor man’ (Smith, 1993).  In 1910, 
the federal government levied a land tax at 
steeply progressive tax rates. This tax was 
successful in raising federal tax revenue, 
but it was less clear whether it successfully 
redistributed wealth (Smith, 1993). The 
federal land tax continued to be levied until 
1952 when the Commonwealth government 
vacated the land tax, leaving it for the states 
to levy. 
CURRENT LAND TAX
Land tax levied at a flat rate on a 
comprehensive base can be one of the 
most efficient taxes, a relatively easy and 
low cost tax to administer and comply 
with, and to have reasonable distribution 
effects, particularly as part of a broader tax 
reform package. However, current state 
(and territory) land taxes and conveyance 
duties with extensive special exemptions 
and progressive rate schedules distort 
important decisions, generate smaller own-
source revenues for the states than they 
could, and their economic incidence has 
some undesirable redistributive effects. Local 
government rates provide a good foundation 
for a reformed state land tax.
All States, except the Northern Territory, 
impose a land tax that is levied on the 
assessed unimproved value of land. The 
tax rate is specified with reference to the 
asset stock value. There are exemptions for 
the primary residence, primary producers, 
charitable, religious and educational 
institutions and some others. All States 
have a progressive rate schedule, but with 
wide differences across the States in the 
thresholds and rates. 
The state land tax base exempts most owner 
occupied housing and primary production 
land. In aggregate, the exemptions represent 
at least 80 per cent of a comprehensive 
land tax base. There are other exemptions 
for other levels of government, some not-
for-profit owners, and special exemptions. 
In most cases the unimproved land value 
is used as the tax base. A progressive rate 
schedule applies to each registered property 
owner; and in general without automatic 
indexation of the thresholds. The top rate 
applied to the asset value varies from 1.5 per 
cent in Tasmania through to 3.7 per cent in 
SA.
The progressive rate tax schedule on land 
which is taxed results in a second and 
additional set of distortions to the efficient 
use of the taxed land resource. Aggregate 
land tax can be minimised by having many 
landowners with small by value parcels of 
land, as opposed to a smaller number of 
owners with larger parcels of land paying 
much higher marginal and average land tax 
rates. Efficiency losses with a progressive 
land tax rate schedule as now in use 
arise from the tax disincentives to exploit 
economies of scale and of scope available 
with the management of larger land parcels.
Together, the base exemption and the 
progressive rate schedule have turned 
the state land tax into an inefficient tax, 
and the exemption adds to the regressive 
redistribution of the tax burden. The municipal 
rates tax by comparison approaches the 
efficient comprehensive base and flat rate 
land tax.
Municipal rates are imposed on broad 
measures of property asset value at a 
flat rate. NSW, QLD, NT and the ACT use 
unimproved land value. WA uses capital 
improved value. A mix of unimproved and 
improved capital values are used by different 
councils in Vic, SA and Tas. Across the nation, 
capital improvements, mainly buildings, are 
about the same value as unimproved land.
Revenue collected from the different taxes in 
2012-13 (from ABS 5506.0):
 ■ State land tax: $6.192 billion
 ■ State conveyance duty: $12.841 billion
 ■ Local government municipal rates: $14.192 
billion
6. Taxes on land
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As unimproved land is the least mobile of 
all tax bases, land tax has negligible effects 
on the level and composition of economic 
activity. Current land taxes are underutilised 
and there are opportunities for both the 
expansion and simplification of land taxes. 
The base exemptions create distortions to 
the efficient allocation of land across the 
taxed and exempt uses. Also, some of the tax 
burden is passed forward as higher costs for 
consumers of the higher tax rate land uses. 
CONVEYANCE (STAMP) DUTY
Stamp duties are taxes on transactions 
(originally, documents) and can be designed 
to tax a number of aspects of economic life. 
Early stamp duties were levied on cheques 
and similar financial documents. States 
began introducing stamp duties on personal 
and commercial transactions in the 1960s, 
taxing all business receipts and in addition 
to the existing duties on cheques and other 
transactions (Smith, 1993). This pattern of 
taxing documents through stamp duties also 
led the states into the area of taxing financial 
services. 
Stamp duties are levied on transfers of 
land, land improvements and buildings. A 
progressive rate schedule is applied to each 
transaction. Progressive rate schedules are 
used, but with differences in thresholds and 
rates across the states, and for example with 
top rates of between 5 and 7 per cent.
As a transaction tax, stamp duties distort 
the reallocation of land from lower value to 
higher value uses (Davidoff and Leigh, 2013, 
and Re:think, 2015). For example, changes in 
technology and markets alter the comparative 
advantages for the location of different 
industries and firms within each industry; and 
changes in family demographics and incomes, 
and of employment, change the preferred 
type of building and location for households.
The Campbell Inquiry (Committee of 
Inquiry, 1981) labelled State stamp duties 
as inefficient taxes; however, States have 
continued to rely heavily on two specific 
stamp duties, primarily on real property and 
insurance. The Campbell Inquiry deemed 
that such taxes affected the efficiency of 
Australia’s financial system by distorting the 
pattern of financial transactions. As a result, 
in 1982 states such as NSW and Victoria 
replaced a number of taxes on bank and 
financial transactions with a single ‘financial 
institutions duty’ (‘FID’). This duty, along with 
other duties such as that on share transfers 
and mortgages & loans, was removed as 
part of the Commonwealth tax reforms in 
2000, that introduced the GST to replace 
stamp duties and other more distorting 
indirect taxes. Some stamp duties were 
also removed as part of the Commonwealth 
2000 tax reforms that introduced the GST. 
Stamp duties that have been removed 
include those on share transfers, mortgages 
and loans, hiring arrangements and rental 
duties and the financial institutions duty 
(FID) and bank account debits tax (BAD) on 
bank transactions. In all states, stamp duties 
remain on property conveyance, insurance 
and motor vehicles.
Conveyance duty paid on the transfer of most 
non-residential and residential property is a 
form of transaction tax; if a person sells or 
gifts the property then tax is paid, but if that 
person continues ownership, no tax is paid. 
In 2012-13 conveyance duty collected $12.8 
billion.
States (except NT) impose an annual fire and 
emergency services levy. While most states 
tag the levy onto the municipal rates tax base 
(most recently, Victoria has implemented 
this change), NSW and Tasmania still use a 
transactions tax or stamp duty to insurance 
premiums on property. The ACT has begun 
an extended transition process to replace its 
stamp duty with a higher flat rate of land tax 
using the municipal rates base.
Conveyance duty is usually payable by the 
purchaser calculated on the sale price of 
the property (or market value if higher). 
Duty rates are progressive, with each 
State adopting a different progressive rate 
schedule with different thresholds and rates. 
Buildings and improvements, in addition to 
the unimproved land value (used for land tax) 
are all included in the base. Duty revenues 
over the last decade have significantly 
increased in all States as house prices have 
risen substantially in many locations. Some 
concessions apply for first home buyers 
although there is broad consensus amongst 
economists that this largely benefits existing 
land owners through increased house prices 
(Gabbitas and Eldridge, 1998).  
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Current conveyance duties are levied at a 
progressive rate on transfers of property, 
with property including land value and 
buildings. Conveyance duties are among the 
most inefficient taxes; they are an additional 
indirect tax on a specific product, buildings 
and they distort the reallocation of residential 
and commercial property. The current tax 
design is inequitable to frequent property 
transferees and is the most volatile of state 
revenue sources. 
The progressive conveyance duty tax rate 
schedule suggests a progressive element in 
the sense that higher value property faces 
a higher average conveyance duty tax rate 
than lower value property. On the other hand, 
to the extent that expenditure on property 
falls as a share of income (with expenditure 
directly in the provision of housing 
accommodation services and indirectly in 
the provision of other goods and services 
provided by property intensive business 
production methods), conveyance duty has a 
regressive element.
Also, conveyance duty might be treated as 
horizontally inequitable.  It imposes a greater 
tax burden on households with similar 
incomes who allocate relatively more of their 
income to property than on other goods and 
services. Those who buy and sell property 
more frequently pay more conveyance 
duty than those who buy and sell property 
infrequently. For example, the Henry Review 
(2010) quotes that while about 18 per cent 
of the population have bought within the 
last three years, and have recently borne 
conveyance duty, 26 per cent have stayed in 
the same property for more than 25 years 
and have paid no conveyance duty.
Some socially beneficial transfers of 
property between different business users 
warranted by changes in product demands, 
technology and other evolutionary business 
circumstances will be deterred by the 
conveyance duty which can be avoided by 
non-sale and persistence with a less valued 
use of the property.
The portion of conveyance duty which falls 
on property improvements and on buildings, 
but not on land, is a form of additional indirect 
tax on a specific business input, buildings, 
and on a specific form of consumption, 
residential housing.5 Given some elasticity of 
supply of resources reallocated from other 
parts of the economy to land improvements 
and to buildings, together with the absence 
of a clear and documented market failure in 
the production and consumption of these 
products, the extra indirect tax results 
in too small a quantity of production and 
consumption of land improvements and to 
buildings.
On the positive side, conveyance duty is 
a simple tax with low costs of both tax 
administration and of tax compliance since it 
uses readily available market data. However, 
as noted above, conveyance duty is a highly 
volatile source of State revenue. It has a 
strong cyclical pattern with downfalls in both 
quantity and prices during recessions, and 
increases in both price and quantity in boom 
phases of the economic cycle. The revenue 
volatility adds to the budget challenges, 
especially for much more stable funding 
requirements over the longer term outlays on 
education, health and law and order. While on-
going valuation of land may be perceived to 
be an administrative challenge, it is conducted 
for local council rates purposes and from the 
perspective of resilience, a regular land tax 
is much more stable and predictable to fund 
ongoing government spending, and would 
help prevent State governments from dealing 
with pressures to spend available funds in 
good times, but also to balance the budget. 
5  This in addition to the GST which is imposed on new 
buildings as a proxy for the present value of the future 
stream of housing services provided by buildings.
19
STAMP DUTIES ON 
INSURANCE
Stamp duties at a flat rate from 6% to 11% 
of the gross premiums (in ACT and South 
Australia respectively) is payable on most 
forms of insurance. A range of exemptions 
are available across the States, including 
(but not limited to) exemptions for annuities, 
workers compensation and hospital or 
medical benefits. In 2012-13 stamp duties on 
insurance collected $4.2 billion, or just over 6 
per cent of state taxation revenue.
Stamp duties on insurance are in effect 
an extra indirect tax on a specific product. 
There is no market failure reason, or other 
logical argument to justify an additional level 
of indirect on insurance above the general 
consumption tax, GST. The relatively high 
aggregate indirect tax burden on insurance 
leads to both non-insurance and under-
insurance. Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that for household and contents insurance, 
the incidence of non- and under-insurance is 
more frequent among the less well-off. That 
is, stamp duties on insurance have significant 
adverse equity and efficiency effects. 
REFORM OF CONVEYANCE 
DUTIES: REPLACE 
CONVEYANCE DUTIES
Conveyance duty has been placed on the 
list for reform by a number of state tax 
reviews (for example, Harvey et al., 2001, 
IPART, 2008, ACT, 2012, and SA, 2015) and 
the Henry Review (Henry, et al., 2010). While 
an important revenue raiser, conveyance 
duty, or stamp duty on the transfer of 
property, is a transaction tax. It is a selective 
additional indirect tax on buildings with no 
logical market failure correction argument. 
Conveyance duty distorts the reallocation 
of property from lower value to higher 
value uses when circumstances change. 
It is the most volatile source of state 
revenue. A challenge for reform is a revenue 
replacement. In the long run, an augmented 
state land tax on a comprehensive base, such 
as the current municipal rate base, with a flat 
rate would have large efficiency gains and 
limited redistribution effects. 
However, the choice of transition 
arrangements to minimise actual and 
perceived redistribution effects requires 
careful design.
Along with the preceding reviews of state 
taxation and AFTS, this paper suggests that 
introducing a replacement land tax with a 
broader base and higher rate will have similar 
long run equity effects, and remove most of 
the efficiency costs. 
A challenge for reform is a revenue 
replacement. In the long run, an 
augmented state land tax would have large 
efficiency gains and limited redistribution 
effects, however the choice of transition 
arrangements to minimise actual and 
perceived redistribution effects requires 
careful design. If this reform was introduced 
in conjunction with a doubling of local tax 
rates, the replacement land tax would have 
an approximately neutral revenue effect. 
However, the political cost and distributional 
effects in the short run should not be 
underestimated and there would likely be 
vocal opposition from infrequent property 
sellers and the asset rich and income poor, 
including many age pensioners. A long 
transition process, such as the ACT strategy, 
may be necessary.
In practice to achieve political support, 
a number of details may be considered. 
Different incremental land tax rates, Tl, might 
be chosen for different categories of land 
and land use by application of (14) to, say, 
residential property, commercial property and 
primary production property, or by geographic 
area such CBD, city-urban and rural. Another 
option could be to start first with a particular 
sector, such as commercial property, almost 
as a demonstration and trial.
 There will be redistribution effects of a 
larger broad based land tax replacement 
for conveyance duty reform package. But, 
the magnitudes of change are easy to 
exaggerate, and they will be less if a longer 
run time period is considered. The shift from 
a property tax base to a land tax base, with 
land being a subset of the larger property 
asset, will have some redistributive effects. 
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The increase in tax burden on land and 
land owners reflects a lower tax burden on 
both the current owners of buildings and 
improvements and on the supply industry 
for future investment in improvements and 
buildings. Current property owners whose 
property assets are more heavily weighted 
to the value of buildings will gain relative to 
those with a relatively high ratio of land to 
other property assets.
For the aggregate population, the proposed 
reform package means on average there 
is no overall loss, and with the efficiency 
gains there will be a net society benefit. 
In particular there will be minimal changes 
in property asset values. However, around 
this long run average net gain, there will 
be individual losers, and also winners, 
especially in the short run. Frequent buyers 
and sellers of property will be winners, while 
infrequent buyers and sellers whose average 
conveyance duty payment over time is below 
the average will be losers. Granted the power 
of the status quo distribution and politics, the 
ethical case against redistribution from those 
who transfer property infrequently to those 
who buy and sell more often seems weak.
Timing of the transition from conveyance 
duty to a land tax replacement will bring 
winners and losers. Those who have recently 
purchased property and paid conveyance 
duty, and those with no plans to sell over the 
next few years, likely will regard themselves 
as facing a higher tax burden; and those 
who planned a transfer in the near future will 
be silent winners. To meet these types of 
concerns, the ACT reform package involves 
a staged process of steps to reduce the 
conveyance tax rate with steps in raising the 
land tax rate, and granting credit for recent 
payments of conveyance duty.
Some asset rich and income poor households 
will be troubled by a land tax for conveyance 
duty reform package. New Zealand has 
enacted a deferred rates payment scheme 
that could assist (DFPNI, 2008). As an 
alternative, government provision of reverse 
mortgage facilities, perhaps only as a default 
option, may be included in the reform 
package (see Productivity Commission, 2014).
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REFORM OF CONVEYANCE 
DUTIES: REMOVE STAMP 
DUTY ON INSURANCE
For equity and efficiency reasons, removal of 
stamp duties on insurance should be a high 
priority. There is no obvious replacement tax 
for these duties. Possible replacements for a 
neutral aggregate revenue neutral tax reform 
package, and also at the state government 
level, include: 
1. Larger land tax
2. Larger payroll tax
3. Larger GST
4. Access to the income tax levied by the 
Commonwealth
Design of the reform package, and in 
particular an aggregate revenue neutral 
package, needs to consider efficiency and 
equity implications of the package. Given that 
estimates of the marginal excess burden for 
stamp duty on insurance exceeds that for the 
suggested replacement taxes, a net gain of 
efficiency is assured. 
A bigger challenge is the design of a reform 
package where the gains of lower insurance 
premiums are approximately matched by 
the distribution of the tax burden of a larger 
land tax, payroll tax, GST, income tax, or 
combination. Clearly, retaining approximate 
distribution neutrality will be feasible only for 
broad categories of households classified by 
income and demography, with winners and 
losers within each category.  
REFORM OF THE EXISTING 
LAND TAX
This paper proposes reforms to the tax base 
and rate schedules of current land taxes. 
There are four elements to reform: 
1. Comprehensive base of unimproved value 
with minimum exemptions
2. A single flat rate with the right for 
individual states to vary the rate 
3. Integration of the operation of land tax 
with local government rates
4. A revenue neutral package would require 
a doubling of local government rates; 
alternatively, additional revenue could be 
raised from other sources.
Such a reform package would remove the 
current distortions and efficiency costs 
described above associated with the base 
exemptions and progressive rate schedule. 
The reform would simplify the tax and 
remove incentives and rewards for socially 
wasteful tax avoidance schemes.
Assessing the equity or redistribution 
effects of land taxes should be considered 
in a broader context than just land tax. 
For business investors in property, both 
individuals and corporations, land tax is a 
deductible expense in measuring taxable 
business income. For individuals, other 
than land for owner occupied buildings, 
rent income is included in taxable income 
and is subject to the progressive income 
tax.6 Corporate income tax, including on 
rent income, serves as a withholding tax 
against the personal income of shareholders. 
For individuals, rent income is only one 
component of income, and land assets are 
only one component of wealth. 
6  In Australia, the income taxation of investment 
income from property, including a land rent component, 
often involves debate about the concessional capital 
gains tax and about the ability to use property expenses, 
including borrowing costs, as a deduction against other 
sources of income. Note also that investment in owner 
occupied housing incurs no income tax on imputed rent 
or on capital gains, but also there are no deductions for 
expenses.
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To meet social equity objectives and 
to assess ability to pay tax for equity, 
it is more direct and better targeted to 
consider all income and/or all wealth 
rather than just the land component. 
While land ownership, especially 
associated with owner occupied homes, 
is widespread in Australia, other than 
for the retired, rent income is relatively 
unimportant for most in the bottom two 
income and asset quintiles.  
It should be noted that although the 
current exemption of the principal place 
of residence and primary production 
from the tax base reflects history rather 
than good tax design principles, the 
political cost associated with removing 
these exemptions should not be 
underestimated. 
An approximate revenue neutral land tax 
reform package would have the effect 
of removing distortions to the efficient 
allocation of land among different uses; 
and it would have relatively small net 
redistribution effects as one-off windfall 
changes in some land asset values. 
HENRY REVIEW 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON REFORM 
OF LAND TAX AND STAMP DUTY
Recommendation 51 
Ideally, there would be no role for any stamp 
duties, including conveyancing stamp duties, in 
a modern Australian tax system. Recognising 
the revenue needs of the States, the removal 
of stamp duty should be achieved through a 
switch to more efficient taxes, such as those 
levied on broad consumption or land bases. 
Increasing land tax at the same time as 
reducing stamp duty has the additional benefit 
of some offsetting impacts on asset prices.
Recommendation 52
Given the efficiency benefits of a broad land 
tax, it should be levied on as broad a base as 
possible. In order to tax more valuable land at 
higher rates, consideration should be given to 
levying land tax using an increasing marginal 
rate schedule, with the lowest rate being zero, 
with thresholds determined by the per-square-
metre value.
Recommendation 53
In the long run, the land tax base should be 
broadened to eventually include all land. If this 
occurs, low-value land, such as most agricultural 
land, would not face a land tax liability where its 
value per square metre is below the lowest rate 
threshold.
Recommendation 54
There are a number of incremental reforms that 
could potentially improve the operation of land 
tax, including:
 ■ ensuring that land tax applies per land 
holding, not on an entity’s total holding, 
in order to promote investment in land 
development;
 ■ eliminating stamp duties on commercial and 
industrial properties in return for a broad land 
tax on those properties; and
 ■ investigating various transitional 
arrangements necessary to achieve a 
broader land tax.
Recommendation 120
States should allow local governments a 
substantial degree of autonomy to set the 
tax rate applicable to property within their 
municipality.
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Tax on motor vehicles was adopted by 
the states in the 1920s and was initially 
conceived of as a luxury levy. However, as 
motor vehicles became more commonplace, 
taxes on motor vehicles became a lucrative 
mass consumption levy. At its peak in the 
1960s, the motor vehicle tax accounted for 
around a fifth of state taxation. Since then, 
however, rising petrol prices have hindered 
proposals to raise motor taxes (Smith, 1993). 
As a mass tax, motor taxes such as 
registration and licence fees are typically 
regressive and are especially burdensome 
for lower income groups. Due to this effect, 
states have not used their motor vehicle 
taxes to fully charge motor users for their 
economic benefit from the services provided 
by government expenditures on road 
construction and maintenance. In addition to 
the regressive impact of the motor vehicle 
tax, there are also practical difficulties to 
motor vehicle taxes playing a more prominent 
role as an economic tool. It is difficult to 
pin down the costs and benefits of motor 
cars, and existing tax structures historically 
have had difficulty in attributing the costs of 
motoring to the major beneficiaries of motor 
usage. Further, existing motor taxes do not 
account for wider costs imposed on society 
by motor cars, such as the cost from traffic 
congestion, accidents and pollution. 
CURRENT TAXES ON MOTOR 
VEHICLES
There are a number of different state taxes on 
motor vehicles. 
Four are described in Table 2: registration fee, 
an annual motor vehicle tax, transfer fees, 
stamp duty on the transfer of vehicles, and 
driver’s license fees. For each of the taxes 
on motor vehicles, the bases and rates vary 
across the States. These State taxes apply 
in addition to the 10% GST and petroleum 
excise levied by the Commonwealth. 
Combined, these charges collect more 
revenue than government expenditure on 
investments in new roads and maintenance 
of roads.
The Commonwealth petroleum excise 
often is advanced as a crude form of user 
pays fee for government investment in, and 
maintenance of, roads, bridges, and other 
transport infrastructure. Most fuel used for 
off road purposes is exempt. There is a loose 
relationship between fuel use and distances 
travelled. However, there is a low correlation 
between fuel use and road damage. A portion 
of local government rates are used to fund 
the maintenance of local roads.
Collectively, federal, state and a portion 
of local government rates generate more 
revenue than in aggregate is spent by the 
three levels of government on investment 
in and maintenance of roads. However, 
while current taxes are a charge on the use 
of motor vehicles, these charges are poorly 
correlated with road damage caused, with 
the external costs of congestion, and with 
the external costs of pollution. There is little 
collected as a crude charge for the external 
costs of pollution and congestion. 
There is no formal justification and logic for 
the chosen bases and rates for the current 
State motor vehicle taxes. The taxes are 
neither charges for the use of government 
provided infrastructure nor charges for the 
external costs associated with pollution and 
congestion. Revenue raising seems to be the 
primary rationale. 
In principle, economic efficiency of special 
taxes on the use of motor vehicles would 
be enhanced by specific taxes for pollution, 
for congestion, and as a user pay fee for 
government-provided road infrastructure and 
associated services, including police and 
emergency services. The current tax bases 
and rates do not follow in a rational way from 
these principles. 
7. Tax on motor vehicles
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RATIONALISE TAXES ON  
MOTOR VEHICLES
Logical argued reform of the special taxation 
of motor vehicles is provided in the Henry 
Review (2010, chapter E3). There it is argued 
to replace the current Commonwealth excise 
on fuel and the state taxes with a user charge 
for vehicle use of roads and associated 
services, a pollution tax to internalize the 
external costs of motor vehicle use, and a 
congestion charge for some roads during 
peak-hour travel times. A comprehensive  
reform package would seek to more closely 
align price signals faced by motorists with 
the social costs they cause by replacing the 
current set of government taxes and charges 
with these three charges. 
The reforms recommended by this paper 
with respect to the taxation of motor vehicles 
are broadly aligned with those proposed by 
the Henry Review. Explicit indirect taxes or 
charges for the operation of motor vehicles 
would involve three components for: 
1. Road construction and maintenance by a 
use charge
2. Congestion by road and time of day
3. Pollution to internalise external cost
The first two charges would be levied 
by the States and final charge by the 
Commonwealth.  Important questions 
with the reform package to be resolved 
include (i) the allocation of responsibility for 
administration of the three categories of 
motor vehicles charges, and (ii) the allocation 
of the revenue collected between the three 
levels of government. The importance of 
interstate vehicle use points to national 
uniform tax bases for simplicity. On the 
other hand, differences in state preferences, 
and the potential gains from competitive 
federalism, favour some delegation in 
the choice of rates to the states and local 
governments. 
Charges for road construction 
and maintenance, and associated 
services
An appropriate form and structure of an 
augmented registration fee would internalise 
the costs to motorists for their use of 
government provided road infrastructure 
and associated services, such as police and 
emergency services. Setting a fee to recover 
the costs of government investment in 
and maintenance of road infrastructure for 
efficiency would be linked to the marginal 
cost per vehicle. Consideration of weight per 
axle, and in a sophisticated model conditional 
on type of road travelled, and distance 
travelled would be considered. Efficiency 
would set price at short run marginal cost. 
However, the importance of overhead and 
fixed costs may require also an annual 
registration fee for fiscal sustainability. 
Alternatively, with continued expansion of 
the demand for road transport with increases 
in population and economic growth, an 
efficiency argument could be made for setting 
a road user charge at the long run marginal 
cost. This reform option would, at the same 
time, generate enough revenue for financial 
viability.
The current annual registration fee and 
stamp duties could be combined as a single 
road user charge. The base for this user 
charge would be redesigned to more closely 
reflect the marginal costs incurred in vehicle 
road damage, that is include reference to 
kilometers travelled and estimated road 
damage per kilometer by vehicle type.
25
HENRY REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS ON ROAD TRANSPORT TAXES
Recommendation 61
Governments should analyse the potential 
network-wide benefits and costs of 
introducing variable congestion pricing 
on existing tolled roads (or lanes), and 
consider extending existing technology 
across heavily congested parts of the road 
network. 
Beyond that, new technologies may 
further enable wider application of road 
pricing if proven cost-effective. In general, 
congestion charges should apply to all 
registered vehicles using congested roads. 
The use of revenues should be transparent 
to the community and subject to further 
institutional reform.
Recommendation 62
The Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) should accelerate the development 
of mass-distance-location pricing for heavy 
vehicles, to ensure that heavy vehicles 
pay for their specific marginal road-wear 
costs. Revenue from road-wear charges 
should be allocated to the owner of the 
affected road, which should be maintained 
in accordance with an asset management 
plan. Differentiated compliance regimes 
to enforce this pricing policy may need 
to be considered to balance efficiency 
benefits from pricing against the costs of 
administration and compliance for some 
road users.
Recommendation 63 
States should improve compulsory third 
party insurance to better reflect individual 
risks.
Recommendation 64 
On routes where road freight is in direct 
competition with rail that is required to 
recover its capital costs, heavy vehicles 
should face an additional charge on a 
comparable basis, where this improves 
the efficient allocation of freight between 
transport modes.
Recommendation 65
Revenue from fuel tax imposed for general 
government purposes should be replaced 
over time with revenue from more efficient 
broad-based taxes. If a decision were 
made to recover costs of roads from road 
users through fuel tax, it should be linked 
to the cost of efficiently financing the road 
network, less costs that can be charged 
directly to road users or collected through 
a network access charge. Fuel tax should 
apply to all fuels used in road transport on 
the basis of energy content, and be indexed 
to the CPI.
Heavy vehicles should be exempt from fuel 
tax and the network access component of 
registration fees if full replacement charges 
are introduced.
Recommendation 66 
The revenue-raising component of State 
taxes on motor vehicle ownership and use 
should be made explicit, and over time only 
be used to recover those costs related to 
road provision. The administrative costs 
of providing government services should 
be recovered through user charges where 
applicable. Quantity limits on taxi licences 
should be phased out.
Recommendation 67
Governments should continue to reform 
road infrastructure provision, applying 
economic assessment to investments 
comparable to that for other forms of 
infrastructure.
Recommendation 68 
COAG should develop a National Road 
Transport Agreement to establish 
objectives, outcomes, outputs and 
incentives to guide governments in the use 
and supply of road infrastructure. COAG 
should nominate a single institution to lead 




Road congestion is a serious market failure 
only for some city roads during peak hours. 
The congestion fee needs to recognise the 
marginal social cost. Modern information 
technology provides a relatively low cost 
technology for a time and road based 
congestion fee, with the fee set at the 
marginal external cost of congestion. There 
remain challenges with concerns about 
privacy.
Congestion costs depend on location and 
time of day. New technology including E-Tags, 
geographic information systems (GIS) and 
hubometers are arriving at lower costs. This 
will likely revolutionise the actual charging 
bases that are feasible and cost effective in 
the future.
At a minimum, in the case of existing and 
proposed toll roads, state governments 
should facilitate a toll rate structure which 
depends on the state of congestion. An 
initial step would have the toll rate vary in a 
pre-announced way by time of day. A more 
sophisticated reform would use available 
information on congestion to regularly revise 
the toll rate, with this information available to 
motorists via apps, etc.
More specifically, a congestion charge could 
be implemented by individual states. This 
includes a more focused strategy of time of 
use charging in allowable contracts for the 
tolls charged by current and proposed toll 
ways. The proposed congestion charge would 
replace also the current city parking levy as a 
more direct fee. 
Charges for pollution
Pollution includes quite localised effects such 
as particulates and smog through to global 
effects attributable to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and climate change. Given the 
difficulty of measuring pollution by individual 
vehicle, a pollution tax on the principal input, 
petroleum products, may be a reasonable 
compromise. The special tax rate(s) would be 
the marginal external cost of the pollution. 
This practical pollution externality tax would 
best come under the Commonwealth excise. 
The carbon tax, if broadly applied as opposed 
to the many exemptions under the Gillard 
government Clean Energy Future package 
of 2012-14, provided an example of a reform 
involving a specific tax to internalize the 
external cost of greenhouse gas pollution. 
More region specific external cost correction 
taxes may be warranted for pollution of 
particulates and other local pollution, including 
noise. Ideally, the pollution taxes would be 
set at the marginal external cost. Simplicity 
may lead to use of fuel or processes as the 
tax base where there is a high correlation 
with a more direct measure of the pollution 
by-product.
A much more moderate first step reform 
of state special taxation of motor vehicles 
would combine stamp duty on the transfer 
of ownership of motor vehicles with 
registration fees and charges, into a larger 
annual registration fee that falls equally 
on all vehicles. The current stamp duty 
discriminates against the sale and purchase 
of new vehicles in favour of retaining 
ownership and operation of older vehicles. 
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Together with taxes on tobacco and alcohol, 
tax on gambling is considered one of the 
‘sin taxes’. Whilst taxes on tobacco and 
alcohol are levied at the Federal level, taxes 
on gambling are levied at the State level. 
Taxes on gambling were first introduced by 
states in the 1940s, following World War 
Two. Since then, there has been an uneasy 
marriage between the government’s dual 
roles as a regulator of societal behaviour 
and as a collector of ‘sin’ taxes. This has 
placed conflicting pressures on the state 
government to both discourage and 
encourage gambling (Smith, 1993). 
CURRENT TAXES ON 
GAMBLING
Gambling taxes became an increasingly 
important revenue-raiser to state 
governments during the 1990s, after 
gambling tax revenues increased dramatically 
due to the gambling deregulation and 
privatization. Taxation of gambling represents 
an important source of state government 
taxation revenue, collecting $5.5 billion in 
2012-13, or 8.7 per cent of all state taxation 
revenue. It is questionable whether the state 
government’s fiscal stake in the gambling 
industry has affected its role of regulating and 
reducing gambling. Further, the gambling tax 
base is under increasing threat from on-line, 
offshore gambling via websites that are hard 
to tax in Australia.
The current taxes on gambling are widely 
diverse. Different bases and different rates 
are applied by each of the states to different 
gambling activities generally categorised into 
wagering, gaming machines, casino gambling 
and lotteries. Tax rates differ markedly without 
clear reason (NSW Treasury, 2014). The tax 
system varies from a percentage of turnover, 
a specific tax per production unit, through to a 
profits-based tax. 
In some cases the gambling taxes are 
designed to share the scarcity rent created 
by government restrictions on supply (e.g., in 
the cases of casinos and gaming machines). 
In other cases the tax seeks to internalise 
some of the external costs associated with 
problem gambling. In most cases, however, 
the overwhelming rationale for gambling 
taxes is as a revenue-raiser on a non-essential 
product with a low elasticity of demand. 
A combination of arguments for special 
taxation of gambling, in addition to the GST, 
income tax and other state taxes. These 
include collecting some of the economic 
rent on government limited supply, a charge 
to internalise some of the external costs 
associated with problem gambling, and as a 
source of hypothecated funds for the horse 
racing industry and some social services 
(associated with problem gambling and 
alcohol related problems). However, as 
argued in the Henry Tax Review (Henry, et 
al., 2010, chapter E7), while special taxation 
of gambling may be warranted, the current 
system is ad hoc and complicated rather than 
a logical system.
REFORM: RETHINK TAXES ON 
GAMBLING
Government restrictions on the supply of 
some gambling services, implemented 
through licensing arrangements, mean that 
some gambling businesses can earn excess 
profits, or economic rent. As economic 
rent is an efficient tax base, it should be 
appropriated by the government either 
through licence fees or taxation. Thus, 
specific taxes imposed on gambling should 
be designed to capture any economic rents 
that have not been captured by licence fees. 
Simplicity would place a standard rate of tax 
on different forms of gambling. A particular 
example of simplicity would replace the 
current array of different rates of tax on 







Gambling taxes should be reviewed 
to ensure that they are focused on 
recouping economic rent generated by 
government restrictions on the supply 
of gambling services or are being used 
efficiently to impose such restrictions.
Recommendation 77
Governments should eliminate gambling 
tax concessions for particular types of 
gambling business, such as clubs. If 
governments wish to subsidise particular 
types of businesses, they should do so 
through direct expenditures.
Recommendation 78
Governments should consider the 
allocation of responsibilities for the 
regulation and taxation of gambling, with 
a view to minimising conflicts in policy-
making between revenue-raising and 
addressing problem gambling.
Alternatively, if, as many argue, demand 
is non-price responsive, then taxation on 
gambling is an efficient tax. A Ramsey 
theorist would vary the tax rate by form 
of gambling according to the elasticity of 
demand to minimise efficiency cost. In the 
absence of compelling data on different 
demand elasticities for different forms of 
gambling, simplicity and equity favours a flat 
rate for all gambling taxes. 
A logical argument for special taxation of 
those forms of gambling where government 
policy restricts the quantity of supply, and in 
particular casinos and gaming machines, is 
government taxation of the economic rent 
or the auctioning of licenses is an efficient 
form of taxation, and one with acceptable 
distribution effects. The economic rent tax 
is a non-distorting transfer from the licensed 
supplier to government, with no effect on the 
market price of gambling or tax burden on the 
gambler. 
For those forms of gambling not subject 
to supply control, including wagering and 
lotteries, a second argument for special 
taxation of gambling is to reduce the 
quantity of gambling. Here, the tax seeks 
to internalise the external costs of problem 
gambling. This argument is problematic for 
two reasons. The majority of gamblers are 
not problem gamblers, but rather, gambling 
is an alternative recreation choice. There is 
compelling evidence that the elasticity of 
demand for many problem gamblers is very 
low, and much lower than for non-problem 
gamblers (Productivity Commission, 1999, 
2010). 
As a result, a tax on gambling applying to 
all distorts the decisions of non-problem 
gamblers with efficiency costs, and at 
the same time it has a limited effect on 
reducing the quantity of gambling by problem 
gamblers. There is limited evidence that 
the current taxes are effective in deterring 
problem gambling. It is not clear how problem 
gamblers react to higher taxes and in some 
forms of gambling, the price of gambling 
is not easily observable (Productivity 
Commission, 2010). 
It should be recognised that because 
gambling taxes constitute an important 
source of State government revenues, in the 
absence of a package of changes involving 
increased revenue from other taxes, the 
states will be reluctant to reduce the amount 
of revenue collected from gambling. 
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In addition to the income, payroll, indirect 
and other taxes levied at similar rates across 
all industries, States currently apply a range 
of additional taxes or royalties on mining. 
These additional charges include a fixed 
rate per unit (e.g., tonne) of production, ad 
valorem royalties as a percentage of value or 
price of resources, or profit-based royalties.7 
In terms of revenue collected, royalties 
are the dominant form of special taxation 
of mining levied by state governments. 
Although not as big as  the State taxes on 
conveyance duty and payrolls, royalties are 
particularly important revenue sources in the 
resource-rich states of Western Australia and 
Queensland.
As sovereign owners of resources in their 
jurisdiction, states levy a variety of mineral 
resource royalties. These royalties are not 
taxes, but operate pre-tax and are levied 
as a price for accessing a non-renewable 
resource owned by the states on behalf of 
their citizens. Mining royalties are significant 
not only because of the revenue raised, but 
because they affect economic efficiency 
and the Australian mining industry. In 2012-
13, state royalties generated $9.3 billion of 
revenue. Since royalties are a deductible 
expense in the calculation of corporate 
income tax, the effective royalty rate is 0.7 
times the royalty rate (= 1 – corporate income 
tax rate). A change in royalty payments flow 
through to a smaller and opposite change 
in Commonwealth corporate income tax 
revenue.
The allocation of mineral rights between 
the Commonwealth and States has been 
a sensitive issue, with the Commonwealth 
government choosing at times to contest 
states’ claim to taxing the mining industry. 
Joint occupancy of a field, such as the 
federal crude oil levy of 1975, has generated 
considerable conflict between the two tiers 
of government and hindered the development 
of an efficient taxation policy. A resource rent 
tax – a federal tax levied on the economic 
7  In terms of legislation, and reporting by ABS 
government accounts, royalties are treated not as a tax 
but a charge.
rent, or ‘unearned increment’, in mining was 
floated in 1975 but abandoned in 1977 by 
the Fraser government and again in 1984 by 
the Hawke government in the face of strong 
opposition from state governments. The 
Hawke government introduced the petroleum 
resource rent tax (PRRT) for some off-shore 
oil and gas deposits in the mid-1980s and this 
was extended onshore to cover oil and gas.
The Henry Review paid particular attention to 
State royalties, identifying over 60 different 
and complex royalty arrangements. The 
Review recommended replacing royalties, 
essentially an ad valorem tax, with an 
economic rent tax, and specifically the 
allowance for corporate equity model. The 
Rudd Labor government relabeled this tax 
as a ‘resource super profits tax’. The Gillard 
Labor government in 2012 enacted a version 
of the proposed resource rent tax, building on 
the PRRT model, to apply in addition to state 
royalties, but with a credit for the royalty cost, 
in the name of the mineral resource rent tax 
(MRRT) for iron ore and coal and a number 
of other design features. The Abbott Coalition 
government repealed the MRRT in 2014. It 
had raised very little revenue.
Royalties are a tax per unit of production, and 
in most cases the rate is an ad valorem rate 
rather than a fixed sum per unit quantity. The 
royalty rate varies by type of mineral, and in 
the case of NSW coal by type of mine and 
for QLD coal by market price. Often, there 
are different rates for the same mineral in 
different states. Royalty rates vary from zero 
for gold in Victoria through 7 per cent for WA 
iron ore and up to 12.5 per cent for QLD coal 
for a coal price above $100/tonne. 
Both low cost and high cost mines face the 
same royalty rate. Industry data indicates that 
the average cost per unit of output of the low 
cost mines is from 30 to 50 per cent below 
the average cost of the marginal mines. 
The former generate large economic rents, 
while marginal mines generate very little 




REFORM OF SPECIAL TAXES 
ON MINING
There are a number of related arguments to 
support special taxes on resources.
First, they are a fee for, or income in 
exchange for, the transfer of community 
owned natural resources for use by private 
mining investors to generate private income. 
Second, with about 80 per cent of the 
Australian mining industry owned by non-
resident investors, the special taxes are a 
transfer of income from non-residents to 
Australians. 
Third, some natural deposits have favoured 
attributes such as lower over-burdens, larger 
and purer deposits, easier access to available 
transport and other key mining inputs that 
result in relatively low costs of production and 
larger economic rents. Taxation of economic 
rents is a relatively non-distorting and efficient 
method of taxation compared with alternative 
state taxes.
Fourth, since the natural resources are non-
renewable resources, for society to sustain 
living standards for future generations the 
economic rent return component should be 
reinvested in other productive investments. 
Government expenditures on education 
and infrastructure meet this sustainability 
requirement.
Reform of the current set of special mining 
taxes levied by the States should be on the 
agenda. The present structure of special 
taxes levied on the mining industries by the 
states is ad hoc, with different royalty rates 
on different minerals in different states. 
While the Henry Review recommended 
replacing royalties with an economic rent tax, 
and specifically an allowance for corporate 
capital version of the cash flow tax, to date, 
implementation has been ineffectual. Further, 
the importance of investments in exploration, 
technology and management to expand 
known reserves and to lower production 
costs both complicates and questions the 
ability to measure economic rent. 
There is an on-going debate about the relative 
merits of the dominant royalty system versus 
an economic rent base tax such as the 
petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT) now used 
by the Commonwealth for off-shore oil and 
gas and the MRRT that applied to iron ore 
and coal over 2011-14. 
Royalty payments are the same across 
mines with very different cost structures 
reflecting different natural resource deposit 
characteristics; those with favourable 
characteristics such as small and easy to 
remove over-burdens, large and rich mineral 
deposits, and easy access to transport) pay 
the same dollars per unit output as mines 
with less favoured natural deposits and 
much higher costs of production. In addition 
to reducing the rewards from mining and 
reducing some mining investment and 
production, royalties can be considered unfair 
with less favoured deposits taxed at the 
same rate as favoured deposits with lower 
production costs.
By contrast, under an economic rent tax, the 
low cost mines generate a larger economic 
rent and pay a larger resource rent tax, 
while the higher cost mines pay less, and 
the marginal mines close to zero. If the 
measured economic rent is a Ricardian rent 
for fixed in supply natural resource deposits, 
the resource rent tax model clearly is more 
efficient, and generally would be considered a 
more equitable special tax. However, even for 
the special case in which measured economic 
rent equals Ricardian rent, governments 
may prefer a royalty because it is easier to 
measure, and/or because the royalty revenue 
stream over time in a world of fluctuating 
commodity prices is more stable.
In reality, some of the measured economic 
rent is a return to investments in exploration 
to discover new reserves, and in investments 
in technology, management and so forth 
which reduces production costs and converts 
some deposits from commercially unviable to 
viable. Many of these investment inputs over 
the longer term have alternative uses and 
are mobile, including investment in mining in 
other countries and investment to increase 
productivity in other industries. Additional 
resource rent taxes on employment of these 
mobile inputs in Australian mining, but not in 
their alternative uses, would reduce the rate 
of outwards shift of the Australian mining 
supply curve. This may also make a resource 
rent tax, based on a measure of profits, more 
vulnerable to profit shifting or tax planning 
than a royalty.
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This paper has described the operation of 
existing state taxes; evaluated the different 
taxes in terms of their effects on revenue, 
efficiency, equity and simplicity; and 
proposed a number of reform packages to 
increase national productivity and improve 
simplicity. 
The reform proposals are approximately 
revenue neutral in aggregate and minimize 
redistribution relative to the current economic 
incidence. The proposed reforms include: 
remove current exemptions to achieve 
comprehensive payroll and land tax bases, 
and apply flat rates with individual State rights 
to choose the rate and to vary it over time; 
remove the transaction taxes on conveyance 
and stamp duties on insurance; replace the 
current suite of Commonwealth and State 
taxes on the use of motor vehicles with a 
user charge and special indirect taxes to 
internalize the external costs of pollution 
and congestion; and, focus special taxes on 
gambling to collect a share of the economic 
rent generating by government restrictions 
on supply. The paper does not address the 
important question of revenue or tax base 
sharing in the income tax and GST.
Major tax reform is infrequent, and once 
enacted the tax system may – indeed, 
should - attain a quasi-constitutional basis to 
ensure stability. Taxation reform confronts 
the usual challenges, but State taxation 
reform, and particularly by an individual state, 
faces additional challenges. Overcoming the 
additional challenges will require cooperation 
between the Commonwealth and states 
and revision of federal-state financial 
arrangements. These challenges include a 
combination of balancing inevitable losers 
who effectively voice their concerns against 
the silent winners, uncertainty about the 
magnitudes of changes, and sometimes also 
about the directions of changes, and the 
difficulty of convincing a sceptical electorate 
of the longer efficiency gains with a net 
positive-sum game outcome.
First, a large share of the national benefits of 
taxation reform by an individual state accrues 
to the Commonwealth and to other states 
rather than to the reforming state. Tax reform 
means a more efficient and larger economy 
with larger income and GST tax bases. The 
Commonwealth benefit from higher income 
tax receipts. Other states gain a share of the 
larger GST receipts via the CGC distribution 
formula. The reforming state bears all of 
the political and transition costs and risks of 
the reform, but it receives only some of the 
benefits. A cooperative tax reform strategy 
across all the states only partly redresses the 
challenges, as the Commonwealth still is a 
winner. Further, achieving cooperation among 
the states seldom is easy.
Second, reform of state taxes by an individual 
state, even if revenue neutral for that state’s 
finances, generally influences the CGC’s 
formula allocation of the GST to different 
states (Warren, 2010). And, a particular state 
can lose some of its share of the GST. There 
may be other second round repercussions 
on the magnitudes of tied grants from the 
Commonwealth.
Third, some of the state tax reform 
opportunities we have discussed are 
interrelated with Commonwealth taxes, 
including the taxation of motor vehicles, 
special taxes on the mining industry and 
pollution taxes. In other cases, revenue 
replacement options include Commonwealth 
taxes, such as a larger GST or a share of 
income tax to fund replacement of stamp 
duties on insurance and some of conveyance 
duty on property transfers. Clearly, 
cooperative negotiations and agreements to 
change federal-state financial arrangements 
are a necessary component for these areas of 
state tax reform.
Fourth, redistributional effects and transition 
issues are not insubstantial in any tax reform. 
In the aggregate and over the long term, we 
argue that these reforms would contribute 
substantially to greater wellbeing and the 
redistributional consequences are not as 
great as they may appear. 
10. Challenges to tax reform
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However, short-term effects and transition 
need to be addressed in any reform. Often 
a tax reform package involving changes to 
Commonwealth and state taxes to meet 
multiple goals of efficiency, equity and 
revenue is critical. 
Finally, debate about tax reform is taking 
place in an era when more revenue is likely 
to be needed (not less), and redistribution or 
compensation for “losers” may be difficult. 
The Australian national fiscal position 
(across the Commonwealth and States) 
has deteriorated in the last decade, while 
government spending as a share of national 
income is projected to increase in future. 
While the fiscal position is on the mend and 
State fiscal positions are better than that 
of the Commonwealth, projected recovery 
in revenues is uncertain (PBO 2015, vi). 
Projections depend on optimistic growth 
forecasts and the projected recovery in fiscal 
balance at State level does not fully account 
for planned reductions in Commonwealth 
funding for hospitals and schools, which likely 
puts upward pressure on State spending. 
Any meaningful reform will require federal 
and state cooperation, including revised 
federal-state financial relations. This highlights 
the importance of the Federal government’s 
promised White Papers in 2016. 
33
ABS, (2014), Taxation Revenue, 2012-13, Catalogue 
5506.0, May. 
Australian Government (2015), “Re:think, Tax Discussion 
Paper”, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.
ACT Treasury (2012), ACT Taxation Review, Canberra
Bird, R and Smart, M (2010), “Assigning State Taxes 
in a Federal Country: The case of Australia”, in 
Melbourne Institute (ed), Melbourne Institute-
Australia’s Future Tax and Transfer Policy 
Conference, Melbourne, 72-94.
Business Council of Australia (2008), Submission to the 
Australia’s Future Tax System Review. 
Cao, L et al. (2015), Understanding the Economy-wide 
Efficiency and Incidence of Major Australian 
Taxes, Treasury Working Paper 2015-01, The 
Treasury, Australian Government, Canberra.
Carling, R (2006), “State Taxation and Fiscal Federalism”, 
The Centre for Independent Studies (CIS, NSW). 
Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System 
(Chaired by Campbell, J.K) (1981), Australian 
financial system: final report of the Committee of 
Inquiry, Canberra. 
Crowe, M (1996), “An Assessment of the Impacts of 
Restructuring Payroll Taxes”, paper presented 
at the 25th Annual Conference of Economists, 
Australian National University, Canberra,  22-26 
September.
Davidoff, I and Leigh, A (2013), “How Do Stamp Duties 
affect the Housing Market?”, Economic Record, 
89(286), 396-410.
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, (2015), 
“COAG and Federal Financial Relations: Issues 
Paper 5”, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Dixon, P et al., (2004), “Payroll Taxes: Thresholds, Firm 
Sizes, Dead-weight Losses and Commonwealth 
Grants Commission Funding”,  The Economic 
Record, 80(250).
Freebairn, J (2009), “Reform of State Taxes”, in Evans 
and Krever (eds). Australian Business Tax Reform 
in Retrospect and Prospect, Thomson Reuters, 
Sydney, 517-536. 
Freebairn, J (2002), ‘Opportunities to Reform State Taxes’, 
Australian Economic Review, 35(4),  405-422. 
Gabbitas, O and Eldridge, D (1998), Directions for State 
Tax Reform, Productivity Commission Staff 
Research Paper, Ausinfo, Canberra. 
Government of Western Australia (2015), Mineral Royalty 
Rate Analysis: Final Report, 2015, Department 
of State Development and Department of Mines 
and Petroleum, Perth.
Harvey, J, N Feeley, J Freebairn, D Pollard and K 
Townsend (2001), Review of State Business 
Taxes, State Business Tax Review Committee, 
Department of Treasury and Finance Melbourne. 
 Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (2008), 
Review of State Taxation, Sydney, NSW. 
NSW Treasury (2014), Interstate Comparison of Taxes 
2013-14
Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) (2015), “National 
Fiscal Trends”Report No. 01/2015.
Productivity Commission (1999), “Australia’s Gambling 
Industry”, Report No. 10, Ausinfo, Canberra. 
Productivity Commission (2010), “Gambling: Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report”, Report No. 50, 
Canberra.
Review of Australia’s Future Tax System: Final Report 
(Henry Tax Review) (December 2009).  
SA Government (2014), State Tax Review Discussion 
Paper, Adelaide.
Smith, J (1993), “Taxing Popularity: The Story of Taxation 
in Australia”, Federalism Research Centre, ANU. 
Stewart, M, Moore, A, Whiteford P, Grafton RQ (2015), “A 
Stocktake of the Tax System and Directions for 
Reform: Five Years After the Henry Review”, Tax 
and Transfer Policy Institute, ANU.
Stewart, M (2011),  “Australia”, in G Bizioli and C 
Sacchetto (eds), Aspects of Fiscal Federalism, 
IBFD, 137-185. 
United Kingdom Department of Finance and Personnel 
(2008), Review of Domestic Rating: Rates 
Deferment Scheme for Home Owning 
Pensioners Public Consultation Paper, Bangor 
(United Kingdom). 
Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance (2001), 
Review of State Business Taxes, Melbourne, 
Victoria. 
Warren, N (2010), “Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Arrangements as a Constraint on State Tax 
Reform Under Henry”, in Evans, C, Krever, R and 
Mellor, P (eds), Australia’s Future Tax System: 
The Prospects After Henry, Thompson Reuters, 
Sydney, 305-364.   
Western Australia Department of Treasury and Finance 
(2007), State Tax Review, WA.
References
34
APPENDIX 1: PAYROLL TAX
Economic Effects of Current State 
Payroll Tax
A simple model of the labour market 
illustrates the longer term effects of 
the current payroll tax on wages and 
employment, distortions to decisions and 
efficiency, and distribution of the tax burden; 
and later to assess a reform package with a 
comprehensive tax base. 
Figure 1.1 shows the market for labour 
with disaggregation for payroll tax exempt 
employment, primarily small businesses 
below the threshold, and payroll taxed 
businesses, and for aggregate employment. 
Labour demand for exempt and taxed 
businesses is represented as DS and DL, 
with aggregate labour demand D = DS + DL. 
For simplicity and some loss of realism, 
demand by the two business categories are 
shown as depending only on the own-sector 
market wage, rather than a more complex 
and realistic dependence on own- and cross-
price wage rates. Also, D would be much 
less elastic than either DS or DL. Aggregate 
labour supply is represented by the supply 
curve S, which generally is considered to be 
inelastic and much less so than aggregate 
labour demand. Wages adjust in the long 
run to equate labour demand and supply, 
or more generally to achieve a similar long 
run unemployment rate for structural and 
frictional unemployment. Simplicity assumes 
that any second round general equilibrium 
effects of different payroll tax regimes on 
aggregate income and its distribution have 
relatively small effects on the market clearing 
wage rate(s).
In the absence of payroll tax, the market 
would set a wage rate of W, with 
employment of ES by small business, EL by 
large business and E = ES + EL in aggregate. 
In the absence of market failures, these 
outcomes also are efficient in terms of 
aggregate employment and its distribution 
between small and large firms. This efficiency 
position assumes small firms are no better 
or worse than large firms in generating 
employment, innovation, productivity, and 
other measures of economic performance. 
Finding logical reasons to contradict this 
assumption are difficult. But, this is not to 
deny the assertions of special interest groups 
that somehow small businesses are the 
key economy drivers. The reality is that both 
small and large businesses have 
pluses and minuses which vary 
by industry and over time.
Suppose a payroll tax at rate T is 
imposed only on large business, 
as is the case of the current 
state payroll tax. In Figure 1.1, 
the selective payroll tax drives 
down the large business labour 
demand curve from DL to 
DL – T, no effect on the labour 
demand curve for the exempt 
small business, and a shift down 
of the aggregate labour demand 
from D to D’. 
Relative to the before payroll tax equilibrium, 
imposition of the selective business payroll 
tax results in a small fall in aggregate 
employment from E to E’ and a larger fall in 
the market wage; given the assumption that 
aggregate labour demand is more elastic 
than supply. With the lower market wage, 
employment in the untaxed small business 
increases from ES to ES’, while the higher 
labour cost to large business of W’ + T > W 
causes them to reduce employment from EL 
to EL’. That is, in a long run equilibrium the 
selective payroll tax requires a reallocation of 
labour from the taxed large business to the 
exempt small business.
Appendices: Economic Analysis
Figure 1.1: Effects of Payroll tax
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Long term redistribution effects of the 
selective payroll tax are very different to the 
statutory incidence. Large businesses pay 
the tax to government. But, the adjustment 
of the wage cost and of employment mean 
that most of the tax in a long run equilibrium 
is passed back to employees of both large 
and small businesses as a lower market 
wage than otherwise (or a lower rate of wage 
increase over time). That is, all employees, 
including those employed by small business, 
bear most of the payroll tax levied on large 
business.
Figure 1.1 also provides information on the 
efficiency costs of the selective payroll tax. 
In terms of the aggregate labour market, the 
reduction of aggregate employment from E to 
E’ involves an efficiency loss of the triangle c 
shown in the third panel, with the lower wage 
reducing take-home pay and the incentive to 
work (taxed) versus leisure (not taxed) and 
to earn income (taxed)to purchase market 
goods and services versus home production 
(not taxed). However, because a payroll tax 
is a tax on labour income, but not on capital 
income, payroll tax does not distort decisions 
on saving and investment as does an income 
tax which falls on both capital income and 
labour income.
Second, the selective payroll tax distorts the 
mix of employment between large business 
and small business. The distortion cost to 
the most efficient employment mix is given 
by the sum of triangles a and b in Figure 1.1. 
The efficiency losses represent differences in 
the marginal product of labour as measured 
by the DS and DL curves reallocated from 
the taxed large business to the untaxed 
small business. An alternative measure of 
the efficiency cost of the distortion within 
the labour market and mix of small and large 
businesses is given by Dixon et al. (2004).  
Approximate measures of the magnitudes of 
the effects of the current narrow base payroll 
tax system employed by the states can be 
provided with information on the slopes or 
elasticities of the labour demand and supply 
curves in Figure 1.1. The fall in the market 
wage rate from W to W’ for the payroll tax of 
T on large business is given by
W – W’ = [(A  / (A + B + C)] T  (8)                                   
where, A is the (absolute value of the) slope 
of the small business labour demand curve (A 
= -dDS/dW = Es EL/W, with Es the absolute 
value of the labour demand elasticity for small 
business), B is the (absolute value of the) 
slope of the large business labour demand 
curve (B = -dDL / dW = El EL / W, with El the 
absolute value of the elasticity of demand 
for labour by large business), C is the slope 
of the aggregate labour supply curve (C = 
dS / dL = ES E / W, with ES the elasticity of 
aggregate labour supply). 
The efficiency cost of payroll tax exemptions 
from a comprehensive base, and in particular 
the small business exemption for over 80 
per cent of businesses and about a half of 
employees, Eloss, is approximately8 given by
Eloss ≈ 0.5 [A B / (A + B)] T2 (9)                                                
where, all terms are defined as above. The 
efficiency cost of the payroll tax distortion 
to the mix of business type employment 
increases with the square of the payroll tax 
rate, T (and more generally the difference in 
the payroll tax rates on different business 
types), and with the price responsiveness, A 
and B, or labour demand elasticities for both 
small and large business employers. 
Reform Options
One payroll tax reform option is to combine a 
comprehensive payroll tax base and a lower 
rate in an approximate revenue neutral reform 
package. Payroll tax rates on a comprehensive 
base with a rate between 2.5 and 3.5 
per cent, depending on the state, would 
generate about the same revenue. Simplicity, 
and associated low tax administration 
and compliance costs, including for small 
business, could be gained by using as the 
comprehensive payroll tax base either the 
existing state workers’ compensation base 
or the existing Commonwealth PAYG labour 
income tax base. Such a package would have 
minimal redistributive effects on employees, 
and by removing distortions to the choice of 
business type it would result in a net gain for 
society.
Given the current payroll tax system with a 
less than comprehensive base El’ = E’ – ES’ 
and tax rate T which generates revenue R’, 
an approximately aggregate revenue neutral 
reform package with a comprehensive base 
8  The approximation assumes the reallocation of 
employment from large to small businesses is balanced, 
when in reality as shown in Figure 1.1 there is a small net 
fall in aggregate employment.
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of approximately E’ and lower tax rate T’ 
means 
T’ = T { El’ / (El’ + Es’)}    (10)                                                     
T’ would vary between 2.5 and 3.5 per cent 
by state. The broad based payroll tax, T’, 
shifts down both the DL and DS curves in 
Figure 1.1; but, for large business by a smaller 
amount than DL – T shown for the narrow 
base tax case. The lower payroll tax rate on a 
comprehensive base in a long run equilibrium 
would result in a lower market wage for all 
employees of W” relative to the before tax 
equilibrium wage W of
W – W” = [(A + B) / (A + B +C)] T’ (11)         
where, all terms are defined above. The 
allocation of labour between small and large 
business would approximate the efficient pre-
payroll tax division.
Combining (8), (10) and (11), the difference 
between the market wage rate received 
by all employees under the current narrow 
base payroll tax, W’, with the market wage 
received by all employees with a lower 
rate and comprehensive base approximate 
revenue neutral package payroll tax, W”, 
can be assessed. The long run equilibrium 
employee wage will be unchanged if
W’ = W”, or if
A / (A + B) = Ql / (Ql + Q) (12)
with all terms defined above. Then, with the 
far right hand term approximately equal to 
a half, (12) holds if the slopes of the small 
business and large business employment 
demand functions are about the same. 
This seems likely given the limited available 
econometric evidence on labour demand 
by firm size. Then, from an employee equity 
or distribution perspective, the wage return 
to employees is unlikely to be significantly 
affected by the reform package.
There would be a net gain to society with the 
reform package from removal of the distortion 
to the mix of business structures given by (9). 
A similar distortion to the aggregate labour 
market, represented by triangle c in Figure 1.1 
would remain.
A more ambitious tax reform would involve 
a comprehensive payroll tax base plus a 
rate above T’ to generate a larger aggregate 
revenue. Two related arguments support 
a larger revenue payroll tax reform. First, 
a broad based tax on labour income, such 
as a payroll tax, has similar low distortion 
costs as a broad based consumption 
tax, such as the GST.9 Neither tax affects 
capital, saving and investment decisions. 
In the long run equilibrium, the labour tax 
exempts capital income earned on saving 
and the consumption tax exempts income 
allocated to saving, and sometimes is 
referred to as a pre-paid consumption tax. 
Both taxes reduce the effective purchasing 
power from an hour of employment. For a 
given market wage, W, paid by employers 
which results in full employment (or an 
equilibrium unemployment rate for structural 
and frictional unemployment), the effective 
employee purchasing power from work, EPP, 
is
EPP = W (1 – Tl) / (1 + Tc) (13)                                            
where, W is the market clearing labour cost 
to employers, Tl is the labour income or 
payroll tax rate and Tc is the consumption or 
GST tax rate. Then, both taxes impose similar 
distortions to labour market decisions. 
With Australia as an open net international 
capital importer country, combined with a 
relatively inelastic supply of labour, optimal 
tax theory says place most of the tax burden 
on the factor in relative inelastic supply, 
namely labour, and that the final incidence of 
tax on either capital income or labour income 
is shifted to labour (Henry Review, 2010, and 
references therein, and illustrated here for 
payroll tax). 
9  Note that this similarity proposition for the two taxes 
is contrary to the estimated costs of the labour income, 
payroll tax and GST reported in the Henry Review (Henry, 
et al., 2010, page 13). Re;think (2015) and The Treasury 
(2015) with more recent estimates draw on the similarity 
of effects of a comprehensive base and flat rate GST 
and payroll tax. However, there are important differences 
in the short run and transition period effects of the two 
taxes. A payroll tax has an origin base, and the GST a 
destination base, which the payroll tax option requires a 
currency depreciation to achieve a long run equilibrium. 
A GST essentially double taxes previous income saved, 
while payroll tax does not tax past savings. 
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A larger revenue payroll tax package would 
mean a lower effective wage to employees 
and a small fall in employment by both large 
and small businesses and in aggregate. 
To the extent that minimum wages are 
a binding constraint for some low wage 
employees, some of the adjustment will be 
an increase in unemployment. It is likely that 
the unemployment response will be more 
important for small business employees. A 
complete general equilibrium assessment of 
the redistribution effects of a larger revenue 
payroll tax reform would require details of the 
use of the additional payroll tax revenue as 
reductions in other taxes and/or increases in 
government expenditure as an offset to the 
lower take-home wage.
APPENDIX 2: LAND TAX
Ideal Land Taxation
A flat rate tax on a comprehensive base of 
rent income has minimal distorting effects 
on decisions affecting the use of the land. 
In the context of a perfectly inelastic supply 
of land, not only in aggregate but also for 
particular parcels of land according to such 
characteristics as location, climate, soil 
fertility, minerals, and so forth, demand by 
different uses and users determines the 
economic rent. The market rent reflects the 
scarcity value of the characteristics offered by 
each land parcel.  
A flat rate broad based rent tax does not 
change the market rent price of the land 
to buyers. This result means the tax does 
not change the allocation of land across the 
different uses and users. Land tax revenue 
is a non-distorting transfer of a share of 
the economic rent from the landowner to 
government.
In principle, land tax would use the flow of 
rent income as the tax base. In practice, to 
minimise operating costs most land taxes 
are assessed as a rate on the asset or stock 
value of land. The two can be closely related. 
As seems reasonable in theory and from 
observed data, the land asset market value, 
A, is given by the present value of the future 
stream of after tax rental income flows, Rt(1 
– Tr), where Rt is the market rate rent return 
per year and Tr is the tax rate on market 
determined rent income. 
Formally
A = ∑ Rt(1 – Tr) / (1 + d)
t  (1)
where, d is the discount rate. Then, as shown 
in the Henry Review (2010, page 270), a 
revenue neutral  land tax assessed on the 
market rent income, Tr, is linked to a land tax 
assessed on the market value of the land 
asset, Tl, and the discount rate, d, as
Tr = Tl / (Tl + d)   (2)                                               
For example, for a 5 per cent discount rate, 
a 1 per cent land asset tax rate of Tl, is 
equivalent to a 17 per cent rent income tax 
rate of Tr.
A further observation from (1) and (2) 
concerns the redistribution effects of a land 
tax. An increase in either Tr or Tl quickly 
becomes reflected in a one-off change in the 
asset value A. Investors arbitrage in allocating 
their savings across land, shares and other 
investment options to approximately equate 
the after tax returns across the different 
investment options. Then, an increase 
(decrease) in either a land asset tax or a 
rent income tax, all other taxes unchanged, 
will result in a one-off decrease (increase) 
of the land asset value. The changed asset 
value becomes a one-off windfall capital loss 
(or gain) for existing land owners to restore 
the after tax income return. After the asset 
price adjustment, investors will be indifferent 
between placing their savings in land at the 
adjusted asset price or the other available 
investment options.
Assessment of Current State Land 
Taxes
Effects of the exemptions from a 
comprehensive land tax base on the 
allocation of land, rent prices and returns, 
distribution of the land tax burden, and 
efficiency costs can be illustrated with a 
simple model. This model also can assess 
the effects of an approximate revenue neutral 
reform package with a comprehensive base 
and a lower rate. The simple model assumes: 
two uses of a fixed supply of residential land, 
namely owner occupied homes now exempt 
from land tax, and rental properties subject 
to a flat rate of land tax on rent income; a 
demand curve for each use represented by 
a negative own price effect; and, rent prices 
adjust to a long run competitive equilibrium. 
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The simple model can be expanded and 
generalized without changing the directions 
of effects and the order of magnitudes, 
but clearly changing the actual magnitudes 
of changes. Other uses of land, such as 
taxed commercial land and untaxed primary 
production property can be considered in 
addition to the two categories of residential 
land. Both direct and cross price terms can 
be included in the demand functions, A 
progressive rate schedule, rather than the 
simplification of a flat rate schedule, adds 
additional efficiency costs. A progressive rate 
schedule would alter the distribution effects 
to favour owners of small land assets by 
value at the expense of holders of larger and 
higher value assets.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the simple model. 
The fixed supply of residential land is 
represented on the horizontal axis as Q^. 
Demand of owner occupied homes for land 
is represented by the curve DO drawn from 
the right hand vertical axis, with demand for 
land for rental housing DR drawn from the left 
hand vertical axis. In the absence of a tax on 
rent income, a competitive market equates 
the two demand curves at a rent rate of R 
and with the split of land at Q. In the absence 
of market failures, Q represents an efficient 
allocation of land between the two uses. 
Given the fixed aggregate supply of land, both 
owner occupied home owners and owners of 
rental property land receive the market rent 
income at rate R.
Effects of the narrow base state land tax 
which exempts land used for owner occupied 
dwellings and falls on land used for rental 
property is illustrated with the tax at rate T. 
Initially, the narrow base land tax shifts the 
demand for land for rental housing down by 
the tax from DR to DR’ = DR – T. The new 
market equilibrium is a lower market rent rate 
of R’, and Q’Q land is reallocated from the 
taxed rental housing to the tax exempt owner 
occupied housing. With current demands and 
taxation the observed allocation of residential 
land at Q’ represents about 75 per cent to 
owner occupied housing (Henry Review, 
2010, p. 261).
The redistribution effects of the concessions 
to the land tax base are on average 
regressive. Owner occupiers lose rent 
income with the lower market rent rate, but 
at the same time they regain it via lower 
cost housing services. Owners of land used 
for rental housing receive a lower after tax 
rent return of R’, but they are able to pass 
forward some of the tax to buyers of rental 
accommodation with a higher after tax rent 
cost of R’ + T > R. Those who rent housing 
are a relatively larger share of the lower 
income population than those who own rental 
property. Also, renters represent a larger 
share of the low income population than 
those who own homes, especially if retirees 
are excluded. 
There is an efficiency loss from the tax 
difference on the two optional uses of land 
given by the triangle of economic surplus 
between the two demand curves DR and DO 
for the reallocated land Q’Q  (representing 
the lower marginal benefit of land allocated 
to owner occupied housing compared with 
rental housing).
Approximate measures of the magnitudes of 
effects of the current state land tax system 
Figure 2.1: Effects of a Selective Land Tax
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described in Figure 2.1 can be expressed in 
terms of the price slopes or elasticites of the 
demand for land functions and of the tax rate. 
The fall in market rent rate from R to R’ is 
given by
R – R’ = (b / (b +β)) T  (3)                                           
where, b is the absolute value of the slope 
of the owner occupied housing demand 
for land (b = - dQ/dR = Eo Q’/R, with Eo 
being the absolute value of the elasticity 
of demand for land by owner occupied), 
β is the absolute value of the slope of the 
rental housing demand for land (β = -dQ/dR 
= Er (Q^ -Q)/R, with Er being the absolute 
value of the elasticity of demand for land for 
rental housing), and T is the tax rate on rent 
received for land allocated to rental housing. 
The proportion of the selective land tax 
passed forward to buyers of rental housing 
increases the less price responsive the rental 
housing demand for land relative to the price 
response for owner occupied land.
A measure of the efficiency cost of the 
selective land tax distortion to the allocation 
of land between the two uses is given by
Efficiency loss = 0.5 T2 (bβ) / (b + β) (4)            
where, all terms are defined as above. The 
efficiency cost of the distortion rises with the 
square of the selective land use tax rate, T, 
and it is larger the more price responsive the 
demand for land use functions, b and β. 
The progressive rate tax schedule on land 
which is taxed results in a second and 
additional set of distortions to the efficient 
use of the taxed land resource. Aggregate 
land tax can be minimised by having many 
landowners with small by value parcels of 
land, as opposed to a smaller number of 
owners with larger parcels of land paying 
much higher marginal and average land tax 
rates. Efficiency losses with a progressive 
land tax rate schedule as now in use 
arise from the tax disincentives to exploit 
economies of scale and of scope available 
with the management of larger land parcels.
Together, the base exemption and the 
progressive rate schedule have turned 
the state land tax into an inefficient tax, 
and the exemption adds to the regressive 
redistribution of the tax burden. The municipal 
rates tax by comparison approaches the 
efficient comprehensive base and flat rate 
land tax.
Reform Options
Suppose a state land tax reform which 
replaces the current narrow base with a 
comprehensive base and a flat rate tax, 
T’, and which generates about the same 
aggregate land tax revenue. In Figure 
2.1, both DR and DO are shifted down by 
T’. A simple and low cost strategy would 
piggy-back the reformed state land tax 
on the current municipal rate base, with 
a streamlined collection of the two via a 
common agency.
The revenue neutral broad base rate of T’ 
relates to the narrow base tax rate T by
T’ = T (Q’ / Q^)   (5)                                              
or, lower by the current base as a proportion 
of the enlarged comprehensive base. In 
terms of current practices, the new broad 
base tax rate T’ would be about 25 per cent 
lower than the current average state land tax 
rate, and it would require less than a 50 per 
cent increase in current municipal rates for 
approximate revenue neutrality.
Some distributional effects of the 
comprehensive land base reform option 
relative to the current narrow State land tax 
are as follows. The market rate of rent would 
remain at the pre-tax rate R for both rental 
housing and for owner occupied housing. 
This represents a gain for occupiers of rental 
housing, and they are over-represented 
among the lower income households. The fall 
of the after tax rent rate to R” becomes 
R – R” = R – T’ = R – T (Q’ / Q^)  (6)             
Comparing R’ of (3), the after tax return to 
rental property landowners with the current 
narrow tax base, with R” of (6), the after tax 
return to rental property landowners with the 
comprehensive tax base, 
R’ – R” = Q’ / Q - b / (b + β)  (7)            
If the price slopes of the two demand curves 
are about the same, and there is scant 
information to the contrary, so that b / (b + β) 
= 0.5, and under current arrangements with 
Q’ / Q^ about 0.75, the after tax rent return 
to rental property landlords falls in a shift to a 
broad base, but only by about a quarter of the 
new broad base land tax rate.
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A comprehensive base and flat rate land tax 
brings efficiency gains from the removal of 
distortions to the allocation of land between 
different uses, quantified in (4), and from 
removal of distortions associated with 
different tax rates of the progressive rate 
schedule for different scales of operation. 
These gains provide a positive sum 
opportunity for benefits to all.
APPENDIX 3 CONVEYANCE 
DUTY
Evaluation of Conveyance Duty
This appendix considers the distribution, 
efficiency and simplicity effects of stamp duty 
as a tax on the transfer of property between 
buyers and sellers.
Figure 3.1 provides a simple picture of the 
market for transferring property from current 
owners to potential buyers. WTS shows the 
supply curve of current property owners 
willing to sell more at a higher price, or a 
measure of the marginal value to them of 
continued ownership. The marginal value 
of purchasing property by new users or for 
new uses is shown by the WTP curve, or 
willingness to pay. For simplicity assume 
a fixed aggregate quantity of property, 
Q^; which is valid for land, but the supply 
of buildings would increase with price. 
A competitive market would transfer Q 
property and establish a market price of P 
to equate WTS with WTP. In the absence of 
market failures, and that seems a reasonable 
assumption, this also is an efficient quantity 
of property transfer.
Then, impose a conveyance duty on the 
transfer of property, and initially have the 
seller pay the stamp duty. The transfer tax of 
T forces the property seller willingness to sell 
function upwards by T from WTS to WTS + T. 
A new market equilibrium involves a smaller 
quantity sold of Q’ < Q, and a rise in the 
market price of property to P’> P, but a fall in 
the value of property after tax to P’-T < P.
Distributional effects of the conveyance duty 
are as follows. While sellers write the tax 
cheque to government, some of the tax is 
passed forward to property buyers as higher 
prices, while all current property owners face 
a fall in property value. Relative elasticities 
of the WTS and WTP curves determine the 
share passed to property buyers and sellers, 
with similar elasticities generating a 50:50 
split. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates a significant distortion 
of conveyance duty to the most efficient 
allocation of property among different 
users. As a transactions tax, conveyance 
duty places a wedge between the net price 
paid by a potential buyer and the net return 
received by a potential seller; in addition to 
other transaction costs of buying and selling. 
The result is a smaller number of property 
transfers, Q’ rather than Q, and a loss of 
economic welfare represented by the triangle 
a. 
Davidoff and Leigh (2013) estimate that the 
37 per cent increase in average conveyance 
duty rates over the 1993 to 2005 period 
reduced property sales by around 11 per cent, 
with an annual welfare loss of between $0.3 
and $0.8 billion. 
Figure 3.1: Conveyance Duty
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Re-think (2015) and the associated Treasury 
Working Paper (Cao, et al., 2015) estimate the 
marginal excess burden of conveyance duty 
at 72 cents per dollar tax revenue (compared 
with a small negative burden for a flat rate 
comprehensive base land tax). 
Reform Options
A common reform option proposal is 
to replace most if not all of the current 
conveyance duty with a broad based land tax 
at a flat rate. An available base is the current 
municipal rate base which covers the land 
component of all residential, commercial 
and primary production property subject to 
conveyance duty. For an approximate revenue 
neutral reform package, the average increase 
in the land tax rate would be of the order
Tl = (Tcon/ A) ( VP/VL)  (14)                                           
where, Tl is the additional average land tax 
rate, Tcon is the current average conveyance 
rate and A is the average number of 
years property is held so that Tcon/A is an 
annualised average conveyance tax rate, VP 
is the value of property, including value of 
land, VL, improvements and buildings, so that 
VP/VL is the share of land value in property 
value. Using aggregate numbers for 2012-13 
for conveyance duty revenue of $12.8 billion 
and municipal rates of $14.2 billion, doubling 
the current municipal rate would provide an 
approximate neutral revenue reform package.
A broader reform package would replace 
conveyance duty and the current state 
land tax with a comprehensive base land 
tax at a flat rate. Ideally the base would be 
unimproved land. However, use of the current 
municipal rate base, with some councils 
using capital improved value rather than 
unimproved value, may be simpler and with 
limited additional efficiency losses.
A larger flat rate land tax for conveyance duty 
reform package would provide significant 
efficiency benefits. First, distortions to the 
transfer of property from lower value to 
higher value uses would be removed, namely 
area a of Figure 3.1. 
Using estimated marginal efficiency costs 
from Re;think (2015) implies gains as large as 
70 cents per dollar of revenue. Each unit of 
land faces the same tax burden, regardless 
of whether it is retained in its current use 
or transferred for another and higher value 
use. Second, shifting the tax burden to 
a comprehensive land tax base which is 
perfectly inelastic in supply from that part of 
the conveyance duty falling on investments 
in improvements and buildings which have 
a positive elasticity of supply removes 
a distortion cost to the price sensitive 
investments.
Certainly there will be redistribution effects of 
a larger broad based land tax replacement for 
conveyance duty reform package; and also if 
the reform package replaces the current state 
land taxes. But, the magnitudes of change are 
easy to exaggerate, and they will be less if a 
longer run time period is considered. 
For the aggregate population, and where the 
focus is on property asset value, the package 
design of (14) means on average there is no 
overall loss, and with the efficiency gains 
there will be a net society benefit. Overall, 
with a similar aggregate tax burden on 
property, the reform package will not change 
the average after tax annual rent return, and 
so no change in asset value given by the 
present value of the expected future stream 
of after tax rents. 
However, around this long run average net 
gain, there will be individual losers, and also 
there will be winners, especially in the short 
run. Frequent buyers and sellers of property 
will be winners, while infrequent buyers 
and sellers whose average conveyance duty 
payment over time is below the average will 
be losers. Granted the power of the status 
quo distribution and politics, the ethical case 
against redistribution from those who transfer 
property infrequently to those who buy and 
sell more often seems weak. Arguably, this 
redistribution is an improvement in horizontal 
equity. But, noting from Figure 3.1 that some 
of the burden of conveyance duty is passed 
back to all property owners as lower asset 
prices than otherwise, the magnitude of the 
loss easily can be exaggerated. 
The shift from a property tax base to a 
land tax base, with land being a subset of 
the larger property asset, will have some 
redistributive effects. The increase in tax 
burden on land and land owners reflects a 
lower tax burden on both the current owners 
of buildings and improvements and on the 
supply industry for future investment in 
improvements and buildings. 
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Current property owners whose property 
assets are more heavily weighted to the value 
of buildings will gain relative to those with a 
relatively high ratio of land to other property 
assets (i.e. those with a relatively high VP/VL 
in (14) will gain).
APPENDIX 4 TAXATION OF 
GAMBLING
Evaluating gambling taxes
A logical argument exists for special 
taxation of those forms of gambling where 
government policy restricts the quantity of 
supply, and in particular casinos and gaming 
machines. In this case, government taxation 
of the economic rent or the auctioning of 
licenses is an efficient form of taxation, and 
one with acceptable distribution effects. 
To illustrate consider Figure 4.1 for the supply 
and demand for a government restricted 
supply gambling product. Note that there is 
some ambiguity as to what is represented 
on the horizontal and vertical axis. Quantity 
is shown as dollars gambled, which could 
mean gross dollars gambled or net gambler 
dollars lost, or it might represent measures 
of number of gaming machines, or casino 
space, for example. The vertical axis, or 
price of gambling, might represent average 
percentage dollar loss, dollar loss per hour or 
average gamble event, for example. Demand 
is given by D. 
Assume a constant marginal cost and then 
a maximum allowed quantity Q giving the 
supply curve ABS. Market price P and 
quantity Q results. The fixed supply generates 
an economic rent of ABCP. 
Taxation of the economic rent might be 
collected by a regular tax per unit quantity 
of regulated supply, including gaming 
machine and casino annual licence fees, or 
by auctioning the limited in supply licences. 
Alternatively, a tax per unit of gambling, such 
as T in Figure 4.1, could be used. Important 
attributes of these economic rent taxes is 
no effect on the gambling quantity or on the 
price paid by the gambler. The later means a 
zero redistributive effect on the population of 
gamblers.
In principle, revenue collected from the 
licence holder could be as high as 100 
per cent of the rent. However, imperfect 
information and risk aversion are likely 
to result in a lower rate. Granted these 
practical considerations, it is likely that state 
governments could raise more revenue on 
taxing economic rents earned by gambling 
operators than with current practice. 
A second argument for special taxation 
of gambling is to reduce the quantity of 
gambling, particularly for those forms of 
gambling not subject to supply control, 
including wagering and lotteries. A tax seeks 
to internalise the external costs of problem 
gambling. This argument is problematic for 
two reasons. The majority of gamblers are not 
problem gamblers, but rather treat gambling 
as an alternative recreation choice. There is 
compelling evidence that the elasticity of 
demand for many problem gamblers is very 
low, and much lower than for non-problem 
gamblers (Productivity Commission, 1999, 
2010). As a result, a tax on gambling applying 
to all gamblers distorts the decisions of 
non-problem gamblers, and at the same 
time it has a limited effect on the quantity of 
gambling by problem gamblers.
Figure 4.1: Taxation of Gambling
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Figure 4.2 illustrates. For simplicity assume 
a perfectly elastic supply at marginal private 
cost. MPC, with two categories of gambling 
consumers, non-problem gamblers with 
demand Dn and no external costs, and 
problem gamblers with a net marginal private 
benefit De and a marginal external cost, 
MEC. Compared to the market quantities 
of price P = MPC and quantities of Qn for 
non-problem gamblers and Qe for problem 
gamblers, the society efficient quantity would 
reduce problem gamblers to quantity Q* for 
an efficiency gain of triangle b + c + d. 
Instead, suppose government imposes a flat 
tax on all gamblers of T. The higher cost of 
gambling relative to a market situation with 
no tax reduces consumption by both non-
problem and problem gamblers to Qn’ and 
Qe’. While the tax reduces problem gambling, 
but likely not much because of the relatively 
low demand elasticity, and internalises some 
of the external cost, the higher price on non-
problem gamblers brings an efficiency cost 
of triangle a. The net efficiency gain, namely 
areas c + d – a, may be very small, and even 
negative. This type of analysis lies behind 
the Henry Review (2010) recommendation to 
seek more direct policy means to reduce the 
problem gambling rather than a general tax 
instrument.
Note also that in Figure 4.2 with a perfectly 
elastic supply curve, all of the tax is born by 
the gambler. More generally, with supply 
more elastic than demand, most of a per 
unit gambling tax will be passed forward as 
a higher price to the consumer. Given that 
gambling expenditure in general falls as a 
share of income, this form of taxation is a 
regressive tax.
A similar model to that of Figure 4.2 can be 
used to challenge the current set of state 
taxes on gambling which place very different 
tax rates on different forms of gambling. 
There is no supporting evidence that the 
current set of higher rates of tax are levied 
on forms of gambling with higher proportions 
of problem gamblers or with higher rates of 
marginal external costs per problem gambler.
Figure 4.2: Taxation of Gambling
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APPENDIX 5 SPECIAL TAXES 
ON MINING
Effects of a royalty
Figure 5.1 illustrates the effects of a state 
royalty on a mineral market. Demand, with 
export demand dominating for most minerals, 
is shown with the downward sloping curve 
D, and the upward sloping curve S shows 
the cost function for all non-natural resource 
deposit inputs, including equipment, labour 
and materials, and taxes applying generally 
to all industries. Point A shows the lowest 
cost mine with the most favoured natural 
resource endowment, with costs increasing 
for less favoured mines and for extending 
existing mines into less favoured deposits. In 
the absence of a royalty, market equilibrium 
would be at price P and quantity Q. Also, the 
area above the supply curve and below the 
price line can be regarded as a measure of 
the economic rent. 
A royalty at rate R shifts the demand curve 
for Australian minerals in Figure A6 down 
from D to D’ = D – R. The royalty causes a 
fall of output to Q’ < Q, a higher market price 
of P’ + R > P, and a lower return to miners 
of P’ < P. The royalty tax revenue of R times 
Q’ is partly paid by buyers as higher prices 
and partly by miners as lower returns than 
before. Since exports account for the majority 
of sales, and non-resident shareholders 
represent about 80 per cent of Australian 
mining company shareholders, most of the 
royalty revenue represents a transfer from 
non-residents to state governments. 
Relative to a royalty free world, the royalty 
induced reduction in production and 
consumption of Australian minerals results in 
an efficiency loss from the global perspective 
of the triangle a. Note that most of this 
efficiency loss falls on non-residents. Given 
the royalty rate, and the net return from 
mining of P’, miners have an incentive to 
invest in exploration, technology and better 
management practices, with the reward of 
all lower costs passed on as higher profits 
per unit output. This is in contrast to the 
economic rent tax discussed next.
Effects of Economic Rent Tax
Consider next in Figure 5.2 the resource rent 
tax. In its ideal form, the resource rent tax 
would fall only on Ricardian rents. Ricardian 
rents are the returns in excess of payments 
for labour, capital and materials. These 
payments are measures of the opportunity 
cost of relocating these inputs from other 
sectors of the economy to mining. Ricardian 
rents are a measure of the 
scarcity value of known non-
renewable natural resource 
deposits. They are larger for 
the lower cost mines with 
relatively higher quality natural 
deposits (with lower over 
burdens, richer and larger 
mineral reserves, close to 
available transport and low 
value alternative uses of 
the mining sites), which are 
assumed to be perfectly 
inelastic in supply. As for 
Figure 5.1, the demand for 
and supply of minerals are 
represented by D and S. In 
the absence of special taxes 
on the mining industry, the market chooses 
quantity Q and price P, with Ricardian rent of 
the triangle between the price line P and the 
supply curve S. 
A tax on the Ricardian rent shown in Figure 
5.2 would take a share, namely PE/PA, of the 
economic rent. Such a pure rent tax would 
not distort or change market outcomes, which 
remain at price P and quantity Q. In principle, 
the Ricardian tax rate could be as high as 100 
per cent. Relative to a royalty which places 
a similar tax on all mines, an economic rent 
tax increases the tax burden on the more 
favoured deposits and a much lower burden, 
Figure 5.1: Royalty
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approaching zero, on the less favoured 
deposits.  Note that all of the tax represents 
a transfer from miners, and ultimately their 
shareholders, to the Australian government. 
No country has applied a 100 per cent 
economic rent tax. In Australia, the PRRT 
rate is 40 per cent, and the now rescinded 
MRRT rate was 22.5 per cent. Two sets of 
reasons are given for a lower rate. First, 
there are significant measurement problems 
in assessing the economic rent at the mine 
level. Most mines have integrated supply 
chains involving some processing and 
transport, as well as mineral extraction. The 
majority of mining companies by share of 
production operate a number of mines, often 
for different minerals and across different 
countries.
Second, and of potentially greater 
importance, is that available measures of 
the economic rent include not only Ricardian 
rent, but also quasi-rents. Quasi-rents are 
above normal returns (that is, over and above 
the opportunity costs of drawing inputs 
from outside the mining sector into mining) 
gained from investment of labour, capital 
and R&D for exploration to increase the 
known available supply of natural resource 
deposits, and into technology and improved 
management and work practices to lower 
the costs per unit of extraction. Often these 
inputs and resulting technologies are fixed in 
supply in the short run and so they can earn 
economic rents. But, with the passage of 
time supply becomes more price responsive 
and market pressures drive down their 
returns to yield normal returns, or income 
falls to cover only opportunity costs.
Measurement of the resource rent tax does 
not distinguish Ricardian rents from quasi-
rents.10 The basic economic rent tax base 
measure is the cash flow or Brown tax. 
Here, economic rent is measured as receipts 
less cash outlays on labour, equipment and 
buildings (or full and immediate depreciation), 
materials and services. The deductions 
represent the opportunity cost of resources 
drawn from other sectors of the economic. 
The residual cash flow represents an above 
normal return or economic rent. 
The resource rent tax (RRT) is a variant of 
the cash flow tax. Rather than a symmetric 
treatment of positive and negative cash flows 
which would involve government writing a 
cheque to miners for negative cash flows, 
negative cash flows are carried forward and 
indexed. Relative to the pure cash flow tax, 
the RRT introduces some distortions with (i) 
the choice of the index rate for negative cash 
flows carried forward, and (ii) the failure to 
pay a share of an accumulated negative cash 
flow. The Henry Review (2010) discusses 
other variants of the cash flow tax, including 
the allowance for capital and the allowance 
for corporate equity models, which were the 
framework of the ill-fated resource super 
profits tax (RSPT). 
10  In principle, economic rent could include also 
monopoly profits. They are assumed to be negligible for 
the mining industry, given its global dimensions and the 
observed volatility of commodity prices.
Figure 5.2: Economic Rent Tax
Figure 5.2.1 Figure 5.2.2
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Figure 5.2.1 illustrates the direction of 
effects on the Australian mining industry of 
a measure of economic rents using the RRT 
or RSPT which includes both Ricardian rents 
and on quasi-rents. Suppose some of the 
scarce resources required for investment in 
exploration, and for improving technology, 
management and work practices to lower 
production costs for existing and potentially 
new mines, or for extending the life and 
production of existing mines, have the 
options of location with other sectors of the 
Australian economy or to mining in other 
countries. An additional tax on the quasi-rents 
generated by these activities if located with 
Australian mining rather than elsewhere will 
result in a smaller investment in these supply 
curve shifting investments, as some relocate 
to another country or industry where only the 
general income taxes apply. Or, the economic 
rent tax results in a delay in the application 
of funds for exploration in Australia, or for 
the adaption of general technology to the 
specific circumstances of the Australian 
mining industry. In effect, the before tax 
industry supply curve S in Figure 5.2 will 
be higher at S + X, with X representing the 
effects of smaller and/or delayed investments 
in exploration and investment activities to 
reduce production costs because of the 
extra tax burden for the Australian mining 
industry location relative to other parts of the 
economy and mining in other countries.
The higher supply curve than otherwise, 
that is S+X rather than S in Figure 5.2.1, 
means the resource rent tax results in 
a fall in production and a higher market 
price. There is an efficiency loss of too little 
production, much like the royalty. Potentially 
more important, also there is a rectangle of 
foregone production cost savings represented 
by the rectangle X times Q’. This later 
productivity loss could mean inferiority of the 
resource rent tax relative to a royalty.
It remains a challenge to obtain the data 
to estimate the magnitude of effect of the 
resource rent tax on the Australian mining 
industry supply curve. Required information 
includes the relative importance of Ricardian 
rent and quasi-rents in the resource rent 
tax measure, the elasticities of supply of 
resources generating quasi-rents to the 
Australian mining industry, and the effects of 
the Australian resource rent tax rate on this 
supply. 
Differences in the relative stability of the 
royalty versus an economic rent tax have 
important implications for industry and for 
government revenue. In the real world of 
fluctuating mining product prices, a royalty 
system provides a more stable flow over time 
of royalty income compared with economic 
rent income; with the opposite effect for 
industry.
For these reasons, there must be uncertainty 
about the relative superiority of a resource 
rent tax over a royalty which generates similar 
government revenue over time.
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Melbourne School of Government
The Melbourne School of Government 
(MSoG) research agenda addresses these 
kinds of governance and policy dilemmas and 
MSoG provides training for people who must 
deal with these in their work.
Research@MSoG aims to provide excellent 
scholarship which has an impact on 
governance and public policy. This research 
underpins our ability to improve the capacity 
of policy makers to make sound decisions, 
design and deliver effective policies and 
programs, and build robust institutions in 
Australia, the region and beyond. 
MSoG’s research agenda is informed by 
global and regional developments, in particular 
those associated with the ‘Asian Century’, 
and how country specific and regional public 
policy will need to adapt and change. Within 
this overarching focus, there are four research 
themes:
 ■ Governance and Performance (designing 
better governing institutions and improving 
policy-making and policy performance)
 ■ Knowledge and Expertise in public policy 
(using different types of evidence and new 
approaches, and managing competing 
perspectives) 
 ■ Security and Political Engagement 
(responding to the effects of war, natural 
disasters, and dispossession, and 
improving political engagement) 
 ■ Governing Markets (improving the 
instruments that structure relationships 
between governments, governing 
institutions, and private actors)
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